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Exchange rate movements have potentially important implications for the domestic
macroeconomy, as they a⁄ect in￿ ation, current account adjustments, and the e⁄ectiveness
of monetary policy. The importance of these implications depends in part on how much of
the exchange rate movements are passed through to changes in import prices. The empirical
literature has shown that the transmission of exchange rate movements to import and con-
sumer prices is modest: on average, over the long run (four quarters), the degree of exchange
rate pass-through is close to zero on consumer prices and it is around 64% on import prices,
in the OECD countries. Moreover the most recent empirical evidence shows that while the
degree of pass-through is increasing on consumer prices, it is declining on import prices. This
evidence has cast doubts on the ability of the exchange rate to a⁄ect domestic economies and
in some circumstances has been used as argument in favor of ￿xed against ￿ exible exchange
rate regimes.
This thesis provides a theoretical foundation to several stylized facts highlighted by the
empirical literature on exchange rate pass-though. The ￿rst chapter of this thesis proposes
a theory able to explain diverging dynamics of exchange rate pass-through on consumer and
import prices, the second reconciles the observed low degrees of pass-through with posi-
tive expenditure switching and ￿nally the third chapter provides a theoretical framework to
explore the declining degree of exchange rate pass-through on import prices. The models pro-
posed in the thesis build on Dornbush (1987): in a partial equilibrium framework, strategic
interactions between domestic and foreign ￿rms together with a linear demand speci￿cation
can generate incomplete exchange rate pass-through on imports and consumer prices.
The ￿rst chapter proposes a model able to explain the diverging dynamics of exchange
rate pass-through on import and consumer prices. The empirical evidence shows that while
the degree of pass-through has declined on imports prices, it has increased on consumer
prices. To our knowledge, the theoretical literature has not investigated the increment in
pass-through on consumer prices, and has not developed a model able to reconcile the dif-
ferent exchange rate pass-through dynamics on import and consumer prices.
The theoretical literature which has explained incomplete pass-through on consumer
price through the presence of distribution services, up to now has assumed perfect compe-
tition in the distribution sector. The e⁄ect of this assumption is that the exchange rate
pass-through on consumer prices mirrors import price exchange rate pass-through dynamics.
When instead distributors have market power, they do adjust their margins in response to
exchange rate shocks. For a given shock, the adjustment in the margins of the distributors
is a function of their market power: the bigger is the market power, the wider the margin




adjustment and the lower the degree of pass-through. If the market power of the distribu-
tors changes over time, so does the degree of pass-through on consumer prices. Therefore by
introducing market power in the distribution sector, the model is able to generate diverging
pass-through dynamics on import and consumer prices.
In the second chapter we propose a mechanism which can explain why substantial
expenditure switching occurs even if the degree of pass-through is low.
A limited degree of pass-through can dampen the expenditure switching e⁄ect of ex-
change rate changes on trade volumes, as it forestalls movements in relative trade prices.
For this reason, part of the international macroeconomic literature has interpreted the low
degree of pass-through as evidence of no expenditure switching. However, a number of em-
pirical works document that exchange rate changes do indeed redirect global expenditure.
We show that if ￿rms engage also in non price competition expenditure switching is stronger
for a given degree of consumer price pass-through.
The model proposed in this chapter builds on Dornbush (1987) introducing quality com-
petition. In an economy where consumers value quality, which is costly for producers to
supply, ￿rms optimally insulate pro￿ts from exchange rate ￿ uctuations by adjusting the
quality of the product they supply. This intervention can take both the form of substituting
the product with a new one that has a smaller content of quality, or changing some features
of the existing product. The way in which the two ￿rms operate in the market can be de-
scribed using a two stage game; ￿rst ￿rms compete in qualities, then they compete in prices.
Both games are static and of complete information, since in each period both ￿rms decide
price and qualities after the realization of the exchange rate shock has occurred. We assume
that quality is a continuous choice variable. The main result of the model is that for a given
degree of exchange rate pass-through expenditure switching is higher when ￿rms also engage
in non price competition. When a depreciation of the domestic currency hits the economy,
the quality of the foreign product falls while its price increases by less than in the standard
duopoly models. The size of the expenditure switching e⁄ect is bigger than in the standard
duopoly models, due to the demand￿ s adjustment along the quality dimension.
The third chapter proposes a theoretical framework for exploring the decline of ex-
change rate pass-through on import prices. In the last years the empirical literature has
shown that the degree of exchange rate pass-through on import prices has decreased over
time. The theoretical literature has proposed di⁄erent theories to account for this empirical
evidence, but none of them has found convincing empirical support. In the third chapter of
this thesis we propose an alternative explanation for the observed decline in the exchange




rate pass-through. Starting from evidence that in the last ￿fteen years the costs of product
development has fallen sharply, we suggest that competition among ￿rms has switched from
price-based to non-price-based. As a result, price stickiness has increased over time, and the
degree of pass-through has declined.
We embed non-price competition into an in￿nitely repeated dynamic duopoly game.
Building on the standard dynamic duopoly models developed in the late eighties, the third
chapter shares with the previous literature the dynamic supply-side e⁄ects, the partial equi-
librium analysis, and the assumption that prices are completely ￿ exible, but add on top of
it non-price competition.
The way in which the two ￿rms operate in the market can be described using a two stage
game; ￿rst ￿rms compete in quality, then they compete in prices. The price competition is a
static game of complete information, since in each period both ￿rms observe the realization
of the exchange rate shock, and because current prices do not have any e⁄ect on future
demand or pro￿ts. The quality choice, also referred to as non-price competition, is instead a
dynamic problem, since any time the product varies from the previous period, ￿rms must pay
an adjustment cost that is assumed to be invariant through time. Given the structure of the
problem it is possible to de￿ne a unique Markov-Perfect equilibrium that is also a rational
expectation equilibrium: the beliefs of a ￿rm about its competitor quality in equilibrium are
correct and equal to the true amount of quality chosen by the competitor.
The model has three main results. First, the degree of exchange rate pass-through
crucially depends on the sector of analysis: the least costly is to change the product after
an exchange rate shock, the lower is the degree of pass-through. Second, the degree of
pass-through is lower the higher the persistence of the shock or the bigger the magnitude of
the shock. This result is motivated by the fact that since it is costly for the ￿rm to adjust
quality, the ￿rm will do it for bigger or more persistent shocks. Quality adjustments reduce
the pro￿tability of price changes generating thus a lower degree of pass-through than in
the standard case. Third, if product adjustment costs decrease, ￿rms adjust quality more
often: as a consequence the degree of pass-through decreases. This is consistent with the
observation that as the costs of changing products have dropped dramatically in the recent
years, the degree of exchange rate pass-through has substantially declined.










COMPETITION AMONG FIRMS, DISTRIBUTION SECTOR
AND EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH
1.1 Introduction
In the last years empirical evidence has shown diverging dynamics of exchange rate pass-
through on import and consumer prices. Some studies present evidence that pass-through
into import prices of industrialized countries has declined in the past decade, especially
on ￿nished goods.1 Some others report that retail price sensitivity to the exchange rate
has increased over the past decade.2 The literature has devoted particular attention to the
former evidence.3 However, to our knowledge, the theoretical literature has not investigated
the increment in pass-through on consumer prices, and has not developed a model able to
reconcile the di⁄erent exchange rate pass-through dynamics on import and consumer prices.
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework to account
for both the declining pass-through on import prices, and the increasing pass-through on
consumer prices. The presence of a distribution sector with market power is the key element
of the model.4 Up to now the theoretical literature on pass-through has assumed a perfect
competitive distribution sector.5 This assumption, while able to deliver extremely neat
results on the role of domestic currency costs, attributes a passive role to the distribution
sector; if this assumption holds, a declining degree of pass-through on import prices, can
only result in a declining degree of pass-through on consumer prices. The assumption that
distributors have market power instead attributes an active role to the distribution sector,
that can actively modify the degree of pass-through by adjusting markups. As shown by the
empirical literature, distributors do adjust markups in response to exchange rate shocks.6
The degree of markups￿adjustments crucially depends on the distributors￿market power: the
1Among others see Marazzi et al. (2005), Frankel et al (2005), Olivei (2002).
2See Campa and Goldberg (2006b)
3See for example Bergin and Feenstra (2007), Gust et al (2006), Taylor (2000).
4Given the assumptions of the model, there exists an inverse relation between "distributors￿ market
power" and "numerosity of distributors": the lower the number of distributors, the higher the distributors￿
market power; for this reason in the text we use the two terms interchangeably.
5See among others Corsetti and Dedola (2004) and Burstein et al (2003).
6See Hellerstein (2004), Goldberg and Verboven (2001), and Berger et al (2007).
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more concentrated is the market (the higher the market power of the distributors), the higher
the markup￿ s adjustment to exchange rate shocks, the lower the degree of pass-through.
The distributors￿market power is thus a key determinant of consumer price exchange rate
pass-through. Everything else equal, a variation in distributors￿market power, generates a
change in consumer prices pass-through, which could eventually have an opposite dynamic
from import price exchange pass-through.
Empirical evidence shows that in the last ten years there has been a progressive liberal-
ization of the distribution sector in all OECD countries, with the exception of the US and
Belgium. Policy to increase competition and thus to reduce the market power of distrib-
utors have been implemented all over the OECD countries. The reduction of distributors￿
market power could have generate an increment of pass-through on consumer price, even if
pass-through on import price has declined. Supportive evidence in favor of this theory is
provided also by the cases of US and Belgium, where a declining degree of pass-through on
consumer prices was coupled with an increasing concentration of the distribution sector.
To model the e⁄ects that the market power of the distributors has on pass-through, we
consider a one sector economy in which a foreign ￿rm competes with a number of domestic
￿rms. The product sold in the market is homogeneous and needs distribution services to
reach consumers. It is assumed that distributors￿marginal costs are in domestic currency
and that distributors possess a degree of market power. The economy is exposed to exchange
rate shocks via the marginal costs of the foreign producer, which are expressed in foreign
currency. The consumers￿demand is linear and exchange rate shocks modify the markups
of both producers and distributors.
Following Dornbush (1987) the degree of pass-through on import prices is a function
of the relative number of domestic and foreign ￿rms: the larger the number of domestic
￿rms, the lower the degree of exchange rate pass-through. The degree of pass-through on
consumer prices depends both on import price pass-through and on the market power of the
distributors.
The model delivers an incomplete degree of exchange rate pass-through in response to
an exchange rate shock. In particular, the larger is the number of domestic ￿rms, the lower
is the degree of pass-through on import prices. The larger is the number of distributors, the
higher is the degree of pass-through on consumer prices. Therefore, under certain conditions,
an increment of the number of domestic producers and distributors, can generate a declining
pass-through on import prices together with an increasing pass-through on consumer prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the motivating
Ascione, Aurora (2009), Three Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26661.2. MOTIVATING EVIDENCE 3
evidence of the paper. In section (1.3) we describe the model. Section (1.4) explains in detail
the e⁄ects that exchange rate shocks have on prices and markups. Section (1.5) discusses
the results and section (1.6) concludes.
1.2 Motivating Evidence
In this section we report the empirical evidence that motivates the paper. The ￿rst part
of this literature review is devoted to evidence on exchange rate pass-through on import and
consumer prices. The second part reports the distribution sector concentration dynamics of
the last 15 years.
We ￿rst report the empirical studies of Campa and Goldberg on the variation of consumer
price pass-through through time. We then concentrate on the literature on pass-through
and distribution sector. There is vast consensus that distribution costs strongly contribute
to explain the scarce responsiveness of consumer prices to exchange rate variations. The
studies which have used micro-dataset also identify an active role of distributors, which, by
strategically adjusting markups, contribute to isolate consumer prices from exchange rate
shocks.
The second part of the section highlights that in the majority of OECD countries, poli-
cies have been promoted to reduce the market power of the distributors. The degree of
distributors￿concentration is likely to have decreased in the last 15 years in most OECD
countries. A notable exception are the US where the concentration of the distributors has
increased.
1.2.1 Distribution Sector and Exchange Rate Pass-through
The degree of exchange rate pass-through on consumer and producer prices is a crucial
variables to understand the transmission of international shocks and the relation between
di⁄erent countries￿economies. The empirical literature has devoted considerable attention
to the measure of the exchange rate pass-through ￿nding that the degree of exchange rate
pass-through on consumers￿prices is far to be complete also in a one year horizon. In
the last years the empirical literature has started to analyze more in detail the reason of
this scarce responsiveness of prices. The empirical research has used macroeconomic and
microeconomics datasets identifying the distribution sector as the most important source of
consumer price unresponsiveness to exchange rates￿variations.
The empirical literature presents evidence that pass-through into import prices of in-
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dustrialized countries has declined in the past decade, particularly on ￿nished goods.7 On
consumer prices instead the degree of exchange rate pass-through has increased in the last
decade: Campa and Goldberg (2006b) look at the evolution over the past decade in the
sensitivity of consumption prices of goods with respect to the exchange rate. They build on
Campa and Goldberg (2006a) analyzing the changes in distribution margins and imported
inputs through time. The analysis studies 16 OECD countries for the period that goes from
1971 to 2004. The authors compare the transmission rate of border price into consumption
price for data around 1995 with data for the year 2000. Their results show that the degree
of pass-through on consumer prices has increased in all the countries of the sample, with the
exception of the United States, Italy, Belgium and Sweden. For the United States and Italy
the decline of consumer price exchange rate pass-through has been mainly due to increases
in expenditure on distribution services.8 Overall the authors also document an increment of
imported inputs in the production of non-traded goods in the majority of countries and the
increase of imported inputs in domestic tradables in all the countries of the sample. The
expenditure on distribution services has had di⁄erent patterns across countries.
Campa and Goldberg (2006a) study the role of distribution costs and imported input
components. They ￿nd that the degree of exchange rate pass-through on consumer price on
a one year horizon for the period that goes from 1975 to 2003 is 17%. In order to explain this
scarce responsiveness of prices, the authors study the e⁄ects that exchange rate ￿ uctuations
have on distribution margins and imported inputs for twenty-one OECD countries. They
measure distribution margins for 29 manufacturing and primary-industry groupings, ￿nding
that margins vary considerably across industries and that there are common patterns across
countries in the incidence of high and low margins for industries. Overall across industries
the total distribution margins in household consumption vary from 32% to 50%. The results
of the paper show that distribution margins and imported input expenditures are crucial
features to explain the degree of exchange rate pass-through across countries.
Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003) propose a model in which distribution costs, mainly
expressed in local currency, do not respond much to exchange rate variations, and thus
drive a wedge between border and retail prices generating a degree of pass-through less than
complete. The authors study the role of distribution costs in shaping the behavior of the real
exchange rate during exchange rate stabilizations ￿nding that their model is able to replicate
the observed real exchange rate dynamics for Argentina in 1991. The authors measure the
7See among others Marazzi et. al (2005), Otani et al. (2005), and Frankel et al. (2005).
8Distribution services are represented by distribution costs and distributors￿margins.
Ascione, Aurora (2009), Three Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26661.2. MOTIVATING EVIDENCE 5
distribution costs associated with consumption goods in the US and in Argentina ￿nding
that the distribution margin in the US is around 46% while in Argentina around 61%. For
the US they document di⁄erent margins for di⁄erent products: for example the distribution
margin for agricultural products vary from 54% to 82%.
Berger et al. (2007) analyze retail prices and the at-the-dock prices of selected items
in the CPI and IPP databases of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The simultaneous use of
the two datasets allows them to compare prices of identical goods at two di⁄erent stages
of the distribution chain. The period covered by the data goes from January 1994 to July
2007. The authors ￿nd that on average distribution margins are around 50-70%. Moreover
distribution margins vary considerably across items; this observation can be explained by
brand e⁄ects and the type of retail outlet and sales. Finally the authors ￿nd that exchange
rates changes only modestly a⁄ect distribution margins.
Hellerstein (2004) measures the degree of exchange rate pass-through in the beer market.
Given the detailed dataset used, the author is able to measure the producers￿and retailers￿
pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes. In the paper a structural econometric model
is estimated, which links ￿rms￿pass-through to the strategic interactions among ￿rms and
among ￿rms and consumers. The data comes from Dominck￿ s Finer Foods, which is a
supermarket chain in the Chicago metropolitan area. The prices are from a scanner dataset
over a period of four years. The results show that retailers play an important role in the
determination of the degree of pass-through on consumer prices. Retailers absorb part of
the exchange rate marginal costs shock, adjusting markups and thus isolating prices from
the marginal costs ￿ uctuations. The measured degree of pass-through on producer prices is
around 69%, but only 80% of the producers￿pass-through is transmitted to ￿nal prices. From
the prices￿dynamics analysis Hellerstein identi￿es strategic interactions between import-
competing domestic producers and foreign producers. Following a depreciation, domestic
producers of brands which are close substitute for foreign brands increase their pro￿ts by
lowering prices to take market shares from the foreign competitors. The strategic response of
domestic producers to exchange rate depreciation generates incomplete exchange rate pass-
through, not only because domestic prices reduce, decreasing the average price of the market,
but also because the foreign producers modifying their markups do not pass-through all the
exchange rate shock in order to maintain market shares.
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) analyze the European car market for the period that goes
from 1980 to 1993. They conduct a microeconomic empirical study using a multiproduct
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oligopoly model with product di⁄erentiation. Among several ￿ndings they report local cur-
rency price stability in response to exchange rate ￿ uctuations. This stability is attributed
approximately for 2/3 to the presence of local components in marginal costs and for 1/3 to
markups adjustments correlated with exchange rate volatility.
All the papers reported in this brief literature review con￿rm, from a macroeconomic and
microeconomic perspective, that the distribution sector and markups￿adjustment strongly
contribute to generate a degree of exchange rate pass-through less than complete. The
distribution sector contributes to reduce the degree of pass-through both because distribution
costs are expressed in local currency and because distributors can adjust their markups in
response to exchange rate variations.
1.2.2 Distribution Sector￿ s Concentration
Distribution margins are made by distributors￿markups and marginal costs: under the
assumption that distribution costs are mainly expressed in local currency, the higher are the
distribution margins the lower is the exchange rate pass-through on consumer prices. The
degree of concentration in the distribution sector can a⁄ect the distribution margins in two
direction. As we will see in the following sections, the higher the degree of concentration,
the higher the markups charged by the ￿rms. On the other hand, since the distribution
sector presents economies of scale, it is likely that the more concentrated is the sector the
lower are the distribution costs and thus the distribution margins. The net e⁄ect that the
concentration in the distribution sector has on the degree of pass-through is ambiguous and
is a function of how much the industry is concentrated and how much concentration reduces
costs. Looking at the US Census of Retail Trade in 1992 and in 2002, we see that the degree
of concentration for the retail sector in the US has increased; the degree of retail trade
concentration is reported in Table 1.
Retail Trade Concentration 1992 2002
4 largest ￿rms 6.8% 11.0%
8 largest ￿rms 10.2% 15.3%
20 largest ￿rms 15.4% 23.9%
50 largest ￿rms 22.4% 31.7%
Table 1.1: Retail Trade Concetration in US
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This table shows that the concentration in the retail sector has increased in the US in
the last years. From the table it is not possible to infer the net e⁄ect that the increment in
concentration has had on distribution margins: if the increase of distributors￿market power
has more than compensate the eventual distribution￿ s costs reduction, the net e⁄ect is that
distribution margins in the US have increased.
In the EU there have been attempts to increase the degree of competition among distrib-
utors in order to reduce retailers￿markups and thus consumer prices. For this reason, among
di⁄erent policies implemented by the European authorities, EU countries are slowly reduc-
ing their market regulations in the retail sector to increase the degree of competition. The
following graphs from the OECD Economic Survey 2006 shows three indicators of regulation
in retail distribution, and the summary of the three indicators.
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The three indicators suggest that on average there has been a reduction of market regulation
in all the countries of the sample, a part from a few exceptions, such as, for example, Belgium,
which is also the most regulated country, and Greece. We can infer that the reduction of
regulation in the OECD countries has induced a reduction in the concentration of the retail
sector in the majority of the OECD countries. In the next section we present a model able
to link the degree of exchange rate pass-through to the concentration in the retail sector;
and we will show that, keeping constant the marginal costs of the distributors, there exists
a negative relation between distributors￿concentration and exchange rate pass-through.
1.3 The model
1.3.1 The market
The market is represented by a single sector in which the product sold is homogenous
and needs distribution services to reach consumers. The demand is linear and equal to:
Q = 1 ￿ P
where P is the price of the homogenous product and Q =
m P
j=1
qj is the total quantity supplied
in the market.
1.3.2 Producers
Home (H) and foreign (F) producers compete in quantities. Producers are big enough
to consider their strategic interactions in the market, they play a one-shot game and do not
have capacity constraints. They have asymmetric marginal costs respectively denominated
as ch and c￿
f". The home marginal costs ch are in home currency, while the foreign marginal
costs c￿
f are in foreign currency, and " is the nominal exchange rate equal to the ratio between
domestic and foreign currency. c￿
f" < 1 and ch < 1 such that the viability of the market
is guaranteed and, since we want to rule out the monopoly outcome, we also assume that
1 + ch > 2c￿
f" and 1 + c￿
f" > 2ch. The number of producers is exogenous and equal to n;
which can be in turn split in n ￿ 1 home producers, and 1 foreign producer.
1.3.3 Distributors
In the market there are m symmetric distributors that compete in quantities, they are
risk neutral and have zero bargaining power. Distributors￿marginal costs are denoted by c
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where P w is the producers￿price and cd is the speci￿c marginal costs associated with the
distribution of the product.9 The contract between producers and distributors is assumed
to be linear.10
1.3.4 The game
The game is in two stages: ￿rst producers choose the quantities and set the price P w at
which they sell to the distributors, then the distributors, taking as given the producers￿price
P w, choose the optimal quantities to supply in the market. The game is solved by backward
induction: we ￿rst solve the problem of the distributors, which maximize their pro￿ts taking
as given the producers￿price P w and then solve the producers￿maximization.
1.3.4.1 Second stage: Distribution
Proposition 1.1 Suppose the assumptions stated in sections (1.3.1), (1.3.2) and (1.3.3)
hold, then in the second stage of the game there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium
characterized by the following price, and quantity:
qd = 1￿Pw￿cd
1+m P d =
1+m(Pw+cd)
1+m :





















that yields the optimal quantity and price stated in Proposition 1, which are a function of
the producers￿price P w.
9It is assumed that c < 1.
10The assumption of linear contracts allows us to analyze in a broader manner the e⁄ects that the dis-
tribution sector has on prices. In the next section we will see that under linear contracts and vertically
separated producers and distributors, the ￿nal price is higher than the optimal price ￿rms would set if they
were vertically integrated (double marginalization occurs). Instead, when ￿rms are vertically integrated,
or there are vertical restraints, such as non-linear pricing or resale price maintenance, producers and dis-
tributors internalize the behavior of each other and set prices as if the distribution sector were competitive.
When m ! 1; the assumption of linear contracts and vertically separated ￿rms deliver the same price under
vertical integration or vertical restraints. The assumption of linear contracts is thus not restrictive and gives
us the possibility to analyze all the cases relevant for the analysis of pass-through.
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1.3.4.2 First Stage: Production
Proposition 1.2 Suppose Proposition 1 holds, then the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium








1 + (n ￿ 1)ch + c￿
f" + ncd￿












































Home producers solve symmetrically the same problem. Combining the reaction functions of








We obtain the optimal values of Proposition 2 by substituting equation (1.1) into Proposition
1.
1.4 Prices and Markups
The consumer price in Proposition 2 is a function of the number of distributors m; the
number of producers n; and the marginal costs of producers and distributors. The number
of distributors enters in the consumer price through the distributors￿markups, since P d can













Ascione, Aurora (2009), Three Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26661.4. PRICES AND MARKUPS 11
and AMCd, which is is the distributors￿average marginal costs and equals:
AMC
d =




As expected, there is a negative relation between the markup ￿d and the number of distrib-
utors m which can be shown through the use of two benchmark cases:
Benchmark case 1: When m = 1 the distribution sector is characterized by a monopoly











When distributors and producers are vertically separated and the oligopoly characterizes
the market structure of production and distribution, the consumer price is a function of
the markups of both distributors and producers. This can be easily shown expressing the


































The retail price P d is thus a function of average marginal costs and markups of both producers
and distributors.
11When m ! 1 the consumer price which prevails in the market is equal to the price one would observe
in the case of vertically integrated producers and distributors.
Ascione, Aurora (2009), Three Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26661.5. RESULTS 12
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Incomplete Exchange Rate Pass-through
When the exchange rate changes the producers￿average marginal costs and the distribu-









Moreover the larger the number of domestic producers with respect to the foreign producers,
the smaller is the e⁄ect that the exchange rate has on AMCw. The model thus predicts that
in sectors where the foreign presence is wider, prices react to the exchange rate more than
in sector with a small foreign presence. The average marginal costs adjustment is a function
of the ratio between domestic and foreign producers: the higher is the number of foreign
￿rms with respect to the total number of producers, the bigger the average marginal costs
variation.


















(1 + m)(n + 1)(AMCd)2 < 0:
For example a home currency depreciation, represented by an increase of the nominal bilat-
eral exchange rate, increases the producers￿average marginal costs, but reduces the markups
of both producers and distributors. Since the distributors￿markups change in the opposite
direction of average marginal costs, the degree of exchange rate pass-through is smaller than
one:
￿d =










1 + n + m
￿





This result depends on three main assumptions of the model: ￿rst, changes in aggregate
purchases of the consumption good change the elasticity of demand; second, ￿rms possess
some degree of market power; ￿nally, the distribution sector￿ s marginal costs are not a
function of the exchange rate. In the following subsections we explain how these assumptions
generate incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
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1.5.1.1 Elasticity of Demand
In this model we have assumed that the consumers￿demand is linear in order to have
that the elasticity of demand is non-constant. When the exchange rate changes, producers￿
average marginal costs change. The change of average marginal costs, modi￿es the consumer
price and thus the quantity purchased and the elasticity of demand. Since the markup is
equal to e=(e￿1); where e is the elasticity of demand, markups adjust generating incomplete
pass-through.
In the last years the theoretical literature that has studied the exchange rate pass-through
has used general equilibrium frameworks with monopolistic competition and CES demand
speci￿cation. These models are able to match several international macroeconomics stylized
facts, but under the assumption of ￿ exible prices, they are not able to generate incomplete








where ￿ is the elasticity of demand and mc￿
i is the foreign marginal costs. It is straightforward
to show that with ￿ exible prices, the exchange rate pass-through is equal to 1, since the
elasticity of demand ￿ does not change when the exchange rate changes, and neither does
the markup, which is equal to ￿=(￿ ￿ 1): Therefore exchange rate shocks fully pass-through
to the price.12
1.5.1.2 Local Currency Distributors Costs
As pointed out in Burstein et al. (2003), when the consumer price is a function of local
currency distribution costs, the degree of pass-through is less than one. This result holds
independently of the competition structure among ￿rms. For example, assuming perfect
competition at the level of both producers and distributors, the consumer price can be




12Ravn (2001) generates incomplete exchange rate pass-through assuming that preferences are CES, and
that in each sector of the economy there are two ￿rms, one domestic one foreign, which compete ￿ la
Cournot. Even if with CES preferences markups do not adjust to exchange rate shocks, the consumer price
does through the average marginal costs variation: exchange rate shocks are idiosyncratic and they only
partially a⁄ect average marginal costs. The model thus generates incomplete pass-through even if markups
stay constant.
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where we assume P w = c￿
f" and cd is the local currency marginal cost. In this case the degree





f" + cd < 1:
This result is generated by the fact that the marginal costs of local currency distributors
make the price a function p; which is not homogenous of degree one in the exchange rate. This
feature generates incomplete pass-through on consumer prices and changes in the distribution
margins in response to changes in the exchange rate. The latter result can be derived as
follows. De￿ne the distribution margin as equal to:
DM =
p ￿ P w
p
;
which represents the fraction of costs due to distribution services in the consumer price.









even under the scenario of perfect competition, an exchange rate variation changes the rela-
tive weight between the distribution costs, expressed in domestic currency, and the produc-
tion costs, expressed in foreign currency, generating an adjustment of the distribution margin
in response to exchange rate variations. If distribution margins do not adjust to exchange
rate shocks, as reported by Berger et al. (2007), it can be either due to the adjustment of
markups at the level of both producer and distribution, or to distribution costs expressed
in foreign currency as well as to a combination of the two factors. The empirical evidence
shows that distribution costs are mainly expressed in local currency, thus it is more likely
that the ￿ndings of Berger et al. (2007) derive from some degree of market power at the
level of producers and/or distributors.
1.5.1.3 Market Power
As equation (1.2) shows, the degree of exchange rate pass-through ￿d is function of m;
the number of distributors, and n; the number of domestic producers:





1 + ch + cd
￿
1 + n + m
￿
1 + (n ￿ 1)ch + c￿
f" + ncd￿￿2 < 0
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an increase of domestic competitors reduces the sensitivity of the consumer price to the
exchange rate, since it reduces the relative weight of the foreign producers￿marginal cost
into the consumer price.







1 + n + m
￿
1 + (n ￿ 1)ch + c￿
f" + ncd￿￿2 > 0:
This results derives from the negative relation between the elasticity of distributors￿markups










The less concentrated is the market, the lower is the elasticity of the markup to the exchange
rate, the lower is the negative e⁄ect that the exchange rate has on the price through the
adjustment of the markup, and thus the higher the degree of pass-through. Therefore, the
degree of concentration of both the production and distribution sector crucially a⁄ects the
exchange rate pass-through on consumer prices: in economies where the distribution sector
is highly concentrated the degree of pass-through will be smaller while the opposite will be
true in economies where the distribution sector is less concentrated.
An increment in the number of domestic producers causes a reduction of the exchange












￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
c￿
f"
1 + (n ￿ 1)ch + c￿
f" ￿ cd








1 + (n ￿ 1)ch + c￿
f" ￿ cd￿2:
If the number of the distributors stays constant, the reduction of exchange rate pass-through
on import prices is completely re￿ ected in a reduction of consumer price pass-through. If
instead the number of domestic distributors contemporaneously increases enough, despite the
reduction of pass-through on import prices, the degree of pass-through on consumer prices
can increase. In this case we would observe diverging pass-through dynamics at consumer and
import prices. We can derive the condition that guarantees an increasing degree of consumer
pass-through when both the number of distributors and domestic producers change. This
is given by imposing that the total di⁄erential with respect to m and n of the consumer
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dn > 0: (1.3)




(1 + (ch + c
d)m)dn:
Hence, as long as the increase in the number of distributors is larger than the RHS of the
expression above, increments in the number of domestic producers can still result in a higher
degree of pass-through on consumer prices.
1.5.2 Comments
The model proposed in this paper introduces in the standard model by Dornbush (1987)
an imperfect competitive distribution sector. When the distribution sector is perfectly com-
petitive, our model￿ s results are close to those of Dornbush (1987): the degree of exchange
rate pass-through is smaller than one and it is a function of the relative number of foreign
and domestic competitors in the market. Our results di⁄er by those of Dornbush to the
extent that we introduce domestic currency distribution costs. This assumption creates an
additional wedge between the marginal costs of the foreign producer and the retail price,
generating a degree of pass-through even lower than in Dornbush (1987).
The model￿ s results in the case of a perfectly competitive distribution sector have been
deeply investigated by the previous literature.13 Up to now, the theoretical literature has
attributed a passive role to the distribution sector in the determination of the exchange rate
pass-through. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction in the analysis of a
distribution sector which has market power: in this way the model can generate di⁄erent
pass-through dynamics at the level of producers and consumers. When distributors are
perfectly competitive, the degree of exchange rate pass-through at the consumer level is
entirely determined by the distribution costs and by the degree of pass-through at the level
of producers. When distributors instead have market power, the degree of exchange rate
pass-through is also a function of their concentration: for example, a high degree of pass-
through at the level of producers can result in a low degree of pass-through at level of
consumers if the concentration in the distribution sector is large enough. The model can
therefore account for the empirical evidence of di⁄erent pass-through dynamics at the level
13See among others Corsetti and Dedola (2004).
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of producers and consumers: variations in the distribution sector￿ s concentration through
time can explain the observed change of the exchange rate pass-through on consumer prices.
Higher competition in the distribution sector can increase the degree of pass-through on
consumer prices, while lower competition decreases it. As we have seen in section (1.2)
in most of the OECD countries in the last decade policies were implemented to promote
competition in the distribution sector. The increase in competition, through the reduction of
distribution margins, could have generated this increment observed in the degree of consumer
price pass-through. Similarly, the increment in the concentration of retailers in the US in
the last decade, can explain the reduction of the exchange rate pass-through on consumer
prices.
The assumption of market power in the distribution sector can be added to other models:
for example Bergin and Feenstra (2008) attribute the declining degree of pass-through to
import prices in the U.S. to an import composition shift from countries with ￿ exible exchange
rates to countries with ￿xed exchange rates. If distributors exercise a degree of market power,
even if the degree of exchange rate pass-through declines on import prices, consumer prices
can still show an increment in the degree of pass-through due to the competition among
distributors: the decline of pass-through on import prices tends to reduce the degree of pass-
through on consumer prices, but variation of the concentration in the distribution sector can
weaken the relation between import and consumer prices.14
The model is able to reproduce the empirical ￿nding that the markups of the distributors
adjust to the exchange rate changes, as documented by Hellerstein (2004), Goldberg and
Verboven (2001) and Berger et al. (2007). It explains the ￿ndings of Campa and Goldberg
(2006b) that the degree of pass-through varies across sectors and across countries: in sectors
(countries) in which only relatively few foreign ￿rms operate, the degree of pass-through
will be smaller than in sectors where the foreign presence is more signi￿cant; at the same
time in a sector (country) where the distribution sector is more competitive the degree of
pass-through will be higher.
Through the use of market power, the distribution sector can break the link between
import and consumers prices. If a country imports mainly intermediate goods, the demand
14As pointed out by Campa and Goldberg (2006b) the transmission of shocks from import to consumer
prices can change if the share of imported inputs in the production of non-traded services that enter the
distribution sector changes, and/or if the share of the distribution sector into ￿nal prices changes. In
the model proposed in this paper we have assumed that distributors￿marginal costs are not a function
of imported inputs, and we have focused the analysis on the concentration in the distribution sector. We
believe that variations in the share of imported inputs are crucial determinants for the degree of exchange
rate pass-through. However, for the sake of simplicity, we have focused on the role of concentration.
Ascione, Aurora (2009), Three Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26661.6. CONCLUSIONS 18
of imports derives from domestic producers; in this case the degree of pass-through on
import prices is the variable to study in order to understand the e⁄ects that exchange rate
variations are likely to have on the country￿ s economy. If instead a country imports mainly
￿nal products, it is the consumers￿demand which drives imports; in this case markups￿
adjustments of the distributors can in￿ uence consumers￿demand and contribute to orient
the demand in favor of domestic or foreign products. By adjusting markups, distributors
a⁄ect the consumer price degree of pass-through, and thus the demand for foreign products.
In this case the study of exchange rate pass-through should concentrate on consumer prices
and on the concentration of distributors.
1.6 Conclusions
In the last decade the exchange rate pass-through on consumer prices has increased,
while it has declined on import prices. In this paper we propose a model to account for
this empirical evidence. In a model where both distributors and producers have market
power, exchange rate shocks do not fully pass-through on import and consumer prices. The
exchange rate pass-through on import prices is function of the relative number of foreign
￿rms with respect to domestic ￿rms: the bigger the number of domestic ￿rms with respect
to foreign ￿rms, the lower the degree of pass-through. On consumer prices, the degree of
pass-through is not only a function of the degree of pass-through on import prices, but also
of the distributors market power. The higher the distributors￿market power the lower the
degree of pass-through on consumer prices.
In a market where the number of foreign producers and of domestic distributors changes,
the degree of pass-through also changes. If the number of domestic producers increases
through time, the degree of pass-through on import prices declines through time. On the
other hand if the number of distributors increases, and thus their market power declines,
the degree of pass-through on consumer prices tends to increase. An increment of domestic
distributors and domestic producers have thus opposite e⁄ects on consumer prices pass-
through. The net e⁄ect will thus depend on which of the two forces prevails. If the increase
of domestic distributors is big enough, the decline of pass-through on import prices can be
more than compensated by a change in the number of distributors, and opposite pass-through
dynamics can be observed on import and consumer prices.
The model can be extended in several directions. A relevant extension would be to embed
it in a general equilibrium framework. In this way it would be possible to study how com-
petition among producers and distributors change the analysis on optimal monetary policy
and optimal exchange rate regimes. The empirical literature suggests that the distribution
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sectors presents economies of scale. In this case, an higher degree of concentration would
generate a decrease in distributors￿costs. An interesting extension would be thus to study
under which conditions an increment in the concentration of distributors increases, rather
than decreases, the degree of consumer price pass-through via a reduction of distributors￿
marginal costs. Finally, it would be interesting to endogenize the number of producers in
the industry to study the e⁄ects that an imperfect competitive distribution sector has on
pass-through and entry of foreign ￿rms in the market. We leave these analyses for future
research.
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INCOMPLETE EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH IN A
MODEL OF QUALITY SWITCHING
2.1 Introduction
A vast body of empirical literature has shown that exchange rate pass-through to con-
sumer prices is close to zero in the short run, and far from being complete in the long
run.1 The degree of exchange rate pass-through is key variable for explaining the role of
exchange rates in the process of external adjustment. A limited degree of pass-through
can dampen the expenditure switching e⁄ect of exchange rate changes on trade volumes, as
it forestalls movements in relative trade prices. For this reason, part of the international
macroeconomic literature has interpreted the low degree of pass-through as evidence of no
expenditure switching. However, a number of empirical works document that exchange rate
changes do indeed redirect global expenditure.2 In this paper we propose a mechanism which
accounts for unresponsive prices to exchange rates together with expenditure switching.
The model presented here investigates the relationship between exchange rate pass-
through and expenditure switching, assuming that ￿rms can compete in price and in non-
price dimensions. Dornbush (1987) and Marston (1990) analyze the relationship between
market structure and the degree of exchange rate pass-through in partial equilibrium frame-
works, considering prices as the unique control variable of producers. A common result of
these models is that exchange rate changes are only partially transmitted to prices. Since
consumers￿purchase decisions depend only on the price level, a low degree of pass-through
has moderate e⁄ects on expenditure switching.
Our model shares with these studies the partial equilibrium framework but introduces
the idea that ￿rms may be able to adjust the quality of the good; in other words, we introduce
non-price competition features. We consider a duopoly in which a domestic and a foreign
￿rm compete in the domestic market. Exchange rate shocks a⁄ect not only ￿rms￿markups,
market shares and prices, but also the quality of products.
1See among others Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2001), Engel and Rogers (1996), Campa and Gold-
berg (2002, 2006).
2For an overview see among others Krugman (1991) and Obstfeld (2001).
22
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We adopt the product di⁄erentiation framework of Hotelling (1929); products are de￿ned
as a triple of characteristics, price, and quality. It is assumed that consumers are heteroge-
nous in the evaluation of characteristics, and homogenous in the evaluation of quality. More
speci￿cally, for a given price, all consumers prefer higher quality content, but they di⁄er in
their evaluation of the characteristics.3 The domestic ￿rm￿ s price and costs are expressed
in the domestic currency. The foreign ￿rm, instead sets its price in domestic currency, but
incurs marginal costs in a di⁄erent currency. This feature exposes the market to exchange
rate ￿ uctuations. In particular, an exchange rate depreciation of the domestic bilateral ex-
change rate increases the foreign ￿rm￿ s costs expressed in domestic currency.4 The foreign
￿rm, in order to insulate its pro￿ts from exchange rate ￿ uctuations, may ￿nd it pro￿table
to change its costs, and this can be done by changing the quality of the product supplied in
the domestic market. This intervention can take both the form of substituting the product
with a new one that has a smaller content of quality, or the form of changing some features
of the existing product.
The way in which the two ￿rms operate in the market can be described using a two stage
game; ￿rst ￿rms compete in qualities, then they compete in prices. Both games are static
and of complete information, since in each period both ￿rms decide the price and qualities
after the realization of the exchange rate shock has occurred. We assume that quality is
continuos choice variable.
The main result of the model is that even when the degree of exchange rate pass-through
is low, expenditure switching does occur. When a depreciation of the domestic currency hits
the economy, the quality of the foreign product falls while its price increases by less than
in the standard duopoly models. The size of the expenditure switching is even bigger than
in the standard duopoly models, due to the demand￿ s adjustment along the price and the
quality dimensions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2.2) provides an overview of the
empirical evidence relevant to the paper. Section (2.3) describes the model. Section (2.4)
concludes.
3Supposing that bicycles are the products of this economy: the quality is represented by the metal used
in production, and the characteristic by their model (for example race bikes, mountain bikes, etc...).
4Notice that since in the price game reaction functions are positively sloped, when the costs of one of the
two ￿rms increase, both ￿rms increase their prices, but the ￿rm that has the costs shock increases the price
more than its competitor.
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2.2 Motivating Evidence
This section is dedicated to a brief review of the macroeconomic literature on expenditure
switching, and to the marketing literature on non-price competition.
2.2.1 Exchange Rate Variation and Expenditure Switching
In the international macroeconomic literature, the limited responsiveness of prices to
the exchange rate, has cast doubts on the capacity of exchange rate variations to generate
expenditure switching, that is, the ability of the exchange rate variations to orient the product
demand in favor of the goods whose currency has depreciated. There is, however, empirical
evidence that exchange rate changes do indeed redirect global expenditure, though perhaps
with lags.
Faruqee (2006) studies the degree of exchange rate pass-through and the expenditure
switching in the euro area for the period that goes from 1990 to 2002. The author performs
an empirical analysis using a vector autoregression (VAR) on the time-series behavior of
the euro exchange rate and a system of euro area prices. Speci￿cally, the empirical analysis
investigates the degree of exchange rate pass-through in a set of prices along the pricing chain.
Faruqee also performs an impulse-response functions￿analysis which is used to calibrate the
key behavioral parameters able to reproduce the pattern of pass-through and the pattern of
the external adjustment in the euro area. With regard to the relation between exchange rate
pass-through and expenditure switching, Faruqee ￿nds that in the European countries, even
if there is local currency pricing and pricing to market behavior, expenditure switching e⁄ects
still operate. In particular, there is evidence that exchange rate depreciations, by redirecting
the demand in favor of the depreciated currency goods, improve the trade balance.
Freund (2000) studies 25 episodes of current account reversal in 25 industrialized coun-
tries ￿nding that nominal exchange rate variations play a crucial role for current account
adjustments. He examines the e⁄ects that eight variables have on current accounts adjust-
ments. The variables analyzed are: the exchange rates, the real incomes, the trade balances,
savings and investments, the short-term interest rates, the budget balances, and the net
international investment positions in the ten-year period surrounding the reversals￿date.
During current accounts reversal, the extent of depreciation varies signi￿cantly across coun-
tries, and in many cases exceeds 10 percent in one year of adjustment. Typically, the real
depreciation begins one year before the current account hit its trough and continues depreci-
ating for three years, with an overall real depreciation of about 20 percent. These variations
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are linked to trade account adjustments: on average in the ￿rst two years, trade balances
improve due to the decline in the import-GDP ratio as real import growth slows sharply. In
the second and third year of recovery the surge in real export growth is responsible for most
of the improvement in the trade balance over the adjustment period.
Debelle and Galati (2005) analyze 21 industrialized countries for the period that goes
from 1974 to 2003. The authors ￿nd that on average the real e⁄ective exchange rate declined
by about 4% during current account reversals, and in some cases the domestic currency fell
sharply generating important variations in the trade balance. The depreciation typically
started two years before the current account de￿cit reached its peak and continued for another
year. This is consistent with a J-curve e⁄ect, whereby the trade balance initially worsens as
the currency starts to depreciate, before improving after about three years. Overall, Debelle
and Galati ￿nd that the exchange rate and output growth contribute signi￿cantly to the
process of adjustment.
Finally, Krugman (1991) analyses the behavior of the dollar exchange rate and the US
trade de￿cit during the eighties. Krugman derives three conclusions about expenditure
switching and exchange rate variations: exchange rate changes cause expenditure switching,
they are necessary to observe expenditure switching and the relation between trade and
exchange rate is stable. Krugman ￿nds that after the dollar declined, export increased
considerably even if with a time length. The exchange rate variations helped the adjustment
process to save some of the real costs that otherwise would have being observed. On the
basis of the evidence about exchange rate movements and trade ￿ ows, Krugman concludes
that exchange rate variations do contribute to the expenditure switching process.
2.2.2 Non-price Competition
The evidence that non-price competition is frequently used as optimal reaction to shocks
by ￿rms is widely documented in the marketing literature.
In his study of the impact of price control in the U.S. after the WWII Rocko⁄ (1984)
￿nds that price controls held the nominal price of several consumption goods constant, with
a contemporaneous deterioration of the goods￿quality in response to change in the market
prices.
Rotemberg (2005) cites two cases discussed in the October 1994 issue of Consumers￿
Reports. The ￿rst case is that of G￿tterman, which changed the design of its threads￿
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packages. The company made its plastic spools fatter so that, when ￿lled with 110 yards
of thread, they would have the same outside dimensions as a previous version of 220 yards
of thread. The price of the newer version was $1.25 while the previous one was $1.45. The
second case regards the Minute Maid Company that signi￿cantly reduced the concentration
of its 12 oz. can of Raspberry Lemonade while keeping the price constant. The company,
questioned about this action, explained that this product variation was motivated by an
increase in the price of the raspberries, which would otherwise have caused a rise in the price
of the lemonade.
Koelln and Rush (1993) collect data of the "text pages" and prices for seven magazines
in the U.S for a period that covers 1950 to 1989. The authors identify the possibility of
altering the number of pages text as a potential means of o⁄setting declines in real price
during the interval between price changes. Koelln and Rush note that the magazine with
the most in￿ exible number of pages over this period also had by far the largest number of
nominal price changes. They interpret this result as supporting the hypothesis that variation
in quality is a potential important alternative to changing the price. The authors also ￿nd a
statistical signi￿cant positive relationship between the number of text pages in a magazine
and the real price of the magazine. That is, as in￿ ation erodes the real price of a magazine
during the interval between nominal price changes, the number of text pages tends to decline.
In the study of Blinder et al. (1989), ￿rms are asked directly about their pricing behavior:
a sample of two hundred managers and price setters of the Northeastern United States
were asked to rank or assign scores to a number of twelve popular economic theories which
were explained to them in non-technical terms. The results show that across sectors of
the economy the theory of "non-price competition" belongs to the top group scores, being
the third most used way to keep prices constant. When the results are divided by sector,
non-price competition is the ￿rst method used by ￿rms to avoid changes in prices in the
manufacturing sector, the second in the trade sector, the third in the service sector. Quoting
Blinder et al.:
￿... many ￿rms appear to leave prices ￿xed in the face of shocks because they
prefer to use one or more avenues of non-price competition to adjust. Rather
than cut prices in the face of sagging demand, ￿rms can and do shorten deliv-
ery lags, raise product quality, improve term of service, or make greater selling
e⁄orts. Non-price competition raises both microeconomic and macroeconomic
questions that have barely been addressed by theorists. Why do ￿rms prefer non-
price competition to price competition even though the former appears to entail
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real resource costs that the latter avoids? What are the welfare implications of
markets that clear along non-price dimensions? The answers to these and other
questions must be left to future research.￿
2.3 The Model
In this section we analyze the conditions which ensure that it is optimal for a ￿rm to
adjust both quality and prices in response to a change in the exchange rate. We consider an
exporting foreign ￿rm that operates in the domestic market, and assume that changes in its
marginal costs are due to changes in the bilateral exchange rate. The analysis is performed
using a modi￿cation of the standard product di⁄erentiation model of Hotelling (1929).
2.3.1 The Environment
It is assumed that products can di⁄er in their ￿characteristic￿and in their ￿quality￿ .
A characteristic is de￿ned as a peculiarity perceived as relevant by consumers, which does
not a⁄ect the product￿ s quality or costs (an example of a characteristic might be the color
of a good). The characteristic of a good is de￿ned on a support that ranges between 0 and
1. This index can be represented on a segment of unit length in which ￿rms and consumers
are located. Quality is de￿ned as a feature on which all consumers agree over the preference
ordering: given the price and the characteristic, each consumer prefers the good with higher
quality (an example of quality might be the raw material used in the production of a good).
2.3.2 Consumers
Consumers are homogenous in their quality evaluation but heterogenous in their eval-
uation of the other characteristic. That is, while at equal price higher quality is always
preferable for the consumer, the same is not true for the characteristic. We assume that
each consumer has a preferred characteristic, ￿x", and that their utility decreases in the
distance between the good￿ s characteristic and x. Moreover, the distribution of x among
consumers is assumed to be uniform in the support [0;1]. It is assumed that consumers have





sf ￿ pf ￿ ￿ jx ￿ fj if they buy good F
sd ￿ pd ￿ ￿ jd ￿ xj if they buy good D
0 if they do not buy
sf and sd denote the quality of goods F and D; respectively, and pf and pd denote their
prices. x 2 [0;1] is the position of the consumer along the segment. ￿ is the marginal cost
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for the consumer of moving away from her preferred characteristic. It is assumed that the
domestic ￿rm produces a good with characteristic ￿d"; located at point 0, and the foreign
￿rm a good with characteristic ￿f"; located at point 1. Consumers are willing to buy good
F as long as sf ￿ pf +￿ jx ￿ fj; and willing to buy good D as long as sd ￿ pd+￿ jd ￿ xj; so
consumers still buy the good as long as the e⁄ective price, represented by the good￿ s price
plus the transportation costs, is less than or equal to the quality supplied.
2.3.3 Firms
The domestic and the foreign ￿rm compete in the domestic market. The foreign ￿rm￿ s
marginal costs, c￿
f, are expressed in foreign currency, while the domestic ￿rm￿ s marginal
costs, cd; are expressed in the domestic currency. Since both pf and pd are expressed in the
domestic currency, the relevant marginal costs of ￿rm F are those expressed in the domestic
currency; these costs ￿ uctuate following the nominal exchange rate variations.
The cost of quality is modeled as a ￿xed cost proportional to the amount of quality
supplied and equal to as2
f and as2
d respectively for ￿rm F and ￿rm D. It is also assumed
that a > 0. An example of a ￿xed cost of quality is the product￿ s costs of advertisement.
Both ￿rms￿￿xed costs are expressed in the domestic currency.
2.3.4 The game
The interaction between the two ￿rms in the market can be described by a two stage
game in which ￿rms ￿rst compete in quality and then compete in prices. In order to analyze
the duopoly outcome we assume:
ASSUMPTION 1: ￿ ￿cd ￿ c
￿
fe + sf ￿ sd
￿ ￿ < 3￿:
Assumption 1 is necessary for a duopoly equilibrium to hold: this is the case when the
marginal costs of the two ￿rms are not too di⁄erent relative to the consumers￿unit trans-
portation costs ￿. Indeed, if cd > c￿
fe ￿ sf + sd + 3￿ ￿rm D has marginal costs which are
too high with respect to ￿rms F to compete in that market, and if c￿
fe > cd + sf ￿ sd + 3￿;
the same would be true for ￿rm F: Given Assumption 1, we can solve the duopoly game
by backward induction. We characterize the price competition equilibrium in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose assumption 1 holds, ￿rms F and D play a duopoly price com-
petition game, that has a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium characterized by the following
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Proof. Let x 2 [0; 1] denote the location of the consumer that is indi⁄erent to purchas-
ing from ￿rm F or from ￿rm D. Thus:
sF ￿ pF ￿ ￿b x = sD ￿ pD ￿ ￿(1 ￿ b x): (2.1)
Solving equation (2.1) for b x provides:




pd ￿ pf + ￿
2￿




pf ￿ pd + ￿
2￿
. (2.2)
It follows from equation (2.2) that the pro￿ts of ￿rms F and ￿rm D are respectively:



























d are respectively the ￿xed cost of supplying quality for ￿rm f and ￿xed cost
of supplying quality for ￿rm d. Maximizing equation (2.3) with respect to pf and maximizing












Equation (2.2), together with the two equilibrium prices, reveals that the equilibrium output
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Given the equilibrium in the price game, we solve the quality game maximizing for each
￿rm the optimal pro￿ts in eq.(2.6), with respect to its own quality, and subject to the optimal










s:t: s￿i = ￿ s￿i for i = f;d
The reaction functions of ￿rm D and ￿rm F are respectively:
RFD = sd =
cd ￿ c￿
fe + ￿ sf ￿ 3￿
1 ￿ 18a￿
RFF = sd = cd ￿ c
￿
fe + 3￿ + (1 ￿ 18a￿)￿ sf
















The conditions above are a maximum as long as
@2￿i
si ￿ 0; which implies a￿ ￿ 1=18. In order
to prove that the pair of qualities above are an equilibrium, it is necessary to show that the
￿rms do not have an incentive to deviate in the second stage of the game, by undercutting the
price and covering all the demand in the market. Taking as given the equilibrium qualities




f ￿ sf ￿ sd + pd ￿ ￿: (2.8)
This inequality implies that also the worker located in the domestic ￿rm prefers to buy the
foreign good. Noting that pro￿t maximization implies that (2.8) must hold with equality,








The foreign ￿rm has no incentives to deviate as long as the undercutting pro￿ts are lower
than the duopoly pro￿ts, that is, as long as pu
f ￿ c￿
fe ￿ as2
f ￿ ￿f;t (sf;sd) ￿ 0. Substituting
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The condition above therefore implies that it is never pro￿table for the foreign ￿rm to
undercut prices. Following the same steps, it is possible to prove that also the domestic ￿rm
has no incentives to deviate. Substituting sf and sd into the optimal values of Proposition 1,
it is then possible to summarize the outcome of the quality game in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2.2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of
the game is de￿ned in Proposition 1. An equilibrium in the duopoly quality competition game
























































































The remainder of the paper will investigate how changes in the exchange rate a⁄ect the
equilibrium. Quality maximization implies that the relevant range for the analysis is the
interval of a￿ 2 [1=18;1): The behavior of the model for a￿ 2 [1=18;1=9) is opposed in
every dimension to its behavior when a￿ 2 (1=9;1), and violates the standard empirical
￿nding that imported goods decrease as the exchange rate depreciates. In what follows I








In this section we study the e⁄ects of exchange rate changes on foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts.
The pro￿ts of the foreign ￿rm are decreasing along the entire domain of e: the higher the
exchange rate, the bigger the foreign ￿rm￿ s marginal costs expressed in domestic currency.
Foreign ￿rm prices per unit of quality will thus be higher, reducing its demand and therefore
its pro￿ts.
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In the foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿gure the straight line represents the pro￿ts of ￿rm F when
quality is ￿xed, while the convex curve represents the pro￿t of ￿rm F when quality can be
optimally adjusted. The convex curve is always above the straight line. The ￿xed quality
pro￿ts have been drawn assuming that the two ￿rms are perfectly symmetric and choose the
same quality for each value of the exchange rate. In the variable quality case, ￿rms are again
perfectly symmetric but, since the choice of quality depends on the di⁄erence between the
marginal costs of the two ￿rms, they choose the same quality only when they have the same
marginal costs, that is when e = 1. At that point the pro￿ts are the same in both scenarios
and the two pro￿t curves are tangent.
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Figure 2.1: Foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts
2.3.6 Qualities
In this section we analyze the e⁄ects that an exchange rate variation has on the optimal
choice of qualities. We ￿rst study why ￿rms optimally adjust quality, and then we analyze
the adjustment￿ s direction.
To determine how the exchange rate￿ s ￿ uctuations a⁄ect the optimal foreign quality we
analyze how marginal costs and revenues changes when the exchange rate change. Firm F￿ s























2(sf ￿ sd + 3￿ + cd) + c￿
fe
18￿
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We notice that the slope of marginal costs (2a) is bigger than that of marginal revenues
(1=9￿) given the condition of maximum for the qualities. An exchange rate depreciation
increases both the intercept of marginal revenues and that of marginal costs, but the marginal














The e⁄ects that an exchange rate depreciation have on the curves is represented in the
following plot:
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The two curves shift up in parallel, but since the shift of marginal costs is bigger than
that of marginal revenues the optimal foreign ￿rm￿ s quality decreases. Marginal costs of
supplying quality increases more than marginal revenues for supply side and demand side
considerations. As we will see in detail in the next section, the supply side e⁄ect is that for
each unit of the good that is sold, the pro￿t margin decreases following an exchange rate
depreciation, and the degree of pass-through is smaller than one. On the demand side on the
other hand, following a depreciation the marginal utility derived by quality stays constant,
while its price increases. Since for each ￿rm the quality enters with a negative sign in the
￿rm￿ s markup, by reducing the amount of quality supplied ￿rms can recover a part of the
markup reduction due to the exchange rate shock, and for each value of the exchange rate
earn a higher amount of pro￿ts than in the ￿xed quality model, as the foreign ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts
picture shows.
We now turn to study how quality adjusts to exchange rate shocks; we ￿rst look at the
equations of qualities at equilibrium, and we then analyze the ￿rms￿reaction functions. The
negative (positive) relation between the exchange rate and the foreign (domestic) ￿rm can














The signs of the two derivatives above is determined by the condition 9a￿ > 1; discussed
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before. The reaction functions of ￿rm D and ￿rm F are respectively:
RFD = sd =
cd ￿ c￿
fe + sf ￿ 3￿
1 ￿ 18a￿
RFF = sd = cd ￿ c
￿
fe + 3￿ + (1 ￿ 18a￿)sf
The reaction functions can be drawn in the space sd;sf: Both functions have a positive
intercept and are negatively sloped since 1 < 18a￿. The slope of the domestic reaction
function is smaller than that of the foreign ￿rm as long as 1 < 9a￿; in this case RFD is
￿ atter than RFF. In the plot below the ￿ atter dotted curves represent the reaction function
of the domestic ￿rm, while the steeper solid curves are those of the foreign ￿rm.
A depreciation of the exchange rate moves to the left the reaction function of ￿rm F; and
shifts up the domestic ￿rm￿ s reaction function. The equilibrium qualities therefore change.
As represented in the ￿gure above, the equilibrium switches from point A to point B, where
the domestic ￿rm￿ s quality has increased and the foreign one￿ s has decreased.
2.3.7 Prices
In order to de￿ne a benchmark scenario to compare our results, our analysis on prices
starts from the case in which ￿rms￿quality is not a control variable. To simplify the analysis
and without loss of generality we assume that each ￿rm chooses the same quality. In this
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case prices are equal to:
e pf =




3￿ + 2cd + c￿
fe
3
We can rewrite these prices as follows:
e pf = ￿fc
￿
fe e pd = ￿dcd





















3￿ + cd + 2c￿
fe
￿











Given the linear demand curve speci￿cation and the structure of the market, an exchange
rate variation a⁄ects both markups and marginal costs. When an exchange rate depreciation
occurs neither the foreign nor the domestic price react one to one to the depreciation. This
is due to the fact that markups vary when the exchange rate changes. This mechanism can























When the exchange rate depreciates markups decrease; this reduction is bigger than the
increase of the second term that is positive and bigger than 1, such that @pf=@e = 2c￿
f=3:
We can hence compute the exchange rate pass-through when a depreciation occurs:
￿f1 =




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; (2.9)
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which is less than 1.
The exchange rate ￿ uctuation also a⁄ects the domestic producer￿ s price. As we can
see above, the domestic ￿rm￿ s price is equal to a markup ￿d over the marginal costs cd.
Domestic marginal costs are not directly a⁄ected by an exchange rate variation, while the
price is instead in￿ uenced through the markup. The derivative of the domestic price with











that is positive, and less than the same derivative computed on the foreign price. An incre-
ment of the exchange rate translates into an increase in the foreign ￿rm￿ s marginal costs,
and consequently of pf: Since the reaction functions are positively sloped, an increase in the
foreign ￿rm￿ s price positively a⁄ects the domestic price, increasing the markup.
Overall, the combined e⁄ect of the reduction of the foreign ￿rm￿ s markup and the increase
of the foreign ￿rm￿ s marginal costs, is bigger than the increment of the domestic ￿rm￿ s
markup. As a consequence, the degree of pass-through on the domestic price is smaller than
the degree of pass-through on the foreign price. A positive degree of pass-through on both
foreign and domestic prices generates two opposite e⁄ects on the process of expenditure
switching. Everything else being equal, higher pass-through to foreign prices will enhance
the expenditure switching e⁄ect of an exchange rate change. In contrast, a positive degree
of pass-through on domestic prices will reduce the expenditure switching e⁄ects. The net
e⁄ect is that we do observe expenditure switching but less than what is predicted by the
standard Mundell-Fleming model.
In the model presented in this paper, the elasticity of the foreign price with respect to













￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿f1:
The degree of exchange rate pass-through is lower than the one observed in the standard
duopoly price competition model, since the foreign producer reduces the quality of the good.
The product￿ s adjustment along the quality dimension, thus generates a degree of exchange
rate pass-through lower than in the standard models.
2.3.8 Market Shares
The negative relation between foreign ￿rms market shares and the exchange rate has
been fully investigated by Dornbusch (1987): a depreciation of the domestic currency reduces
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foreign ￿rms￿market shares but increases those of domestic ￿rms. In Dornbusch￿ s analysis
the price is the only control variable and foreign ￿rms￿market shares decrease for each value
of the exchange rate.
In our model, quality is introduced as an additional control variable. Market shares are
sensitive to quality, since quality is fully observable and it enters in the consumers￿utility
function. When ￿rms can adjust the quality of the product supplied in the market, market
shares vary more in response of an exchange rate shock, than in the standard duopoly price
competition model. Suppose that an exchange rate depreciation occurs and the quality of
the foreign ￿rm decreases. The quality reduction generates an extra channel of market share


















The foreign ￿rm loses market shares because of the price increase (represented by term
￿cf=6￿), but also because consumers observe the quality reduction (represented by the
term ￿cf=(9a￿ ￿ 1)6a￿), and realize that the price per unit of quality has increased even
further; consumers thus reward the domestic ￿rm whose quality has instead increased. The
expenditure switching e⁄ect in favor of the domestic ￿rmis magni￿ed by the quality variation.
In response to an exchange rate shock, the market clears both through the price and through
the real channel of quality. The result is a lower degree of pass-through and a higher degree of
expenditure switching with respect to the standard Dornbush model of duopoly competition.
2.3.9 Welfare analysis: surplus variation
When producers adjust the quality of their products, the price adjustment to the ex-
change variation is smaller than in the standard model. The quality adjustment generated
by the exchange rate a⁄ects the consumers￿welfare. For example, the welfare￿ s change of a














￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿:
This variation is partly due to the price change (represented by the term 2=3+1=3(1￿9a￿)),
and partly due to the quality change (represented by the term cf=(1 ￿ 9a￿)). The latter
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variation is seldom measured by econometricians who usually observe only prices, and rarely
have information on the quality of the products. Since quality variation are not reported,
it is assumed that quality stays constant. Relying on this assumption the measure of the











￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿:
which is smaller than @Wfn=@e: The unobservability of quality, typically translates into the
assumption that quality stays constant through time. This assumption is not innocuous
since it might lead to an underestimation of the true welfare change. When quality is taken
into account instead, changes in the exchange rate have a bigger impact on consumer surplus
and therefore also on expenditure switching.
2.4 Conclusions
The empirical literature documents a scarce responsiveness of prices to the exchange
rate. A part of the theoretical literature explains this evidence relying on the assumption on
nominal rigidities.5 If imports as well as domestic prices are rigid, the exchange rate ￿ uctua-
tions cannot switch domestic demand in favor of the goods whose currency has depreciated.
The ￿ exible exchange rate becomes powerless to alter international relative prices, and loses
its allocative role. As a consequence, exchange rate ￿ uctuations have no expenditure switch-
ing power: that is, the ability of orienting the demand in favor of the goods whose currency
depreciates. While these theories are able to match the empirical evidence on the exchange
rate pass-through, they fail to reconcile the behavior of pass-through with the documented
e⁄ect of expenditure switching.
Our model can ful￿ll this task. Through quality adjustments the model breaks the link
between prices and quantities, showing that a low degree of pass-through is compatible with
a positive expenditure switching. The assumptions that ￿rms compete in prices and in
qualities, and that consumers care about quality are crucial for this result. While empirical
studies on pass-through can only observe prices and not qualities, consumers observe both,
and form their consumption decisions accordingly. After an exchange rate depreciation,
the foreign price modestly increases, and its quality decreases. Part of the consumers who
were buying the foreign good before the shock, switch to the domestic good whose quality-
price ratio increases relatively to the foreign ￿rm. We thus observe a positive expenditure
switching in favor of the domestic product together with a low degree of pass-through.
5See among the others Devereux and Engel (2003) and Devereux and Yetman (2005).
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Our model shows that exchange rate ￿ uctuations can modify not only prices but also
other features of the good: for example through the non-price channel the exchange rate
can perform its role of international adjustment mechanism. We believe that it would be
interesting to study dynamic supply side and demand side e⁄ects. If dynamic considerations
are introduced into the analysis it is very likely that the e⁄ects of permanent and transitory
changes in the exchange rate value will a⁄ect prices and market shares in a di⁄erent way.
From a demand side perspective it would be interesting to study how the results change
when qualities are not observable by consumers. Intuition suggests that ￿rms will most
likely cheat on the consumers, selling low quality goods at high quality prices. In this case
the expenditure switching will probably be lower than in the model presented in this paper.
These issues are probably worth considering in future research.
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DECREASING EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH AND
NON-PRICE COMPETITION
3.1 Introduction
In the last years the empirical literature on exchange rate pass-through has shown that
the degree of price stickiness has increased over time. Gopinath and Rigobon (2006) ￿nd
that the average probability of a change in prices has declined by 10% from 1994 to 2004.
Taylor (2000), Campa and Goldberg (2005) and Marazzi et al (2005) have documented that
the degree of pass-through was substantially lower in the 1990s, compared to earlier decades.
Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005) also report evidence of declining pass-through using eight
narrowly de￿ned brand commodities. Several hypotheses have been proposed to account for
this decline. These explanations rely on the assumption that the composition of imported
goods has shifted either from homogenous goods to di⁄erentiated goods or from goods im-
ported from developed economies to goods imported from developing countries. However,
these stories have failed to ￿nd convincing empirical support. Gopinath and Rigobon (2006)
test these theories and show that almost all of the decline in the degree of pass-through is
explained by within-sector and within country time trends, the role played by composition
e⁄ects being negligible.
In this paper we propose an alternative explanation for the observed decline in the
exchange rate pass-through. The main idea starts from the fact that the reduction of the
costs required for the development of new products has made non-price competition cheaper.
Competition among ￿rms has therefore switched from price-based to non-price-based. As
a result, price stickiness has increased over time, and reduced the degree of exchange rate
pass-through.
There is by now a common consensus in the literature of business and management
that the costs of developing new products has dropped dramatically in the last 15 years.
This reduction has been mainly motivated by the increased use of information technology
in the production process, and by the improvement in the software for product design. The
new technology has improved product characteristics, and reduced the costs and the time
44
Ascione, Aurora (2009), Three Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26663.1. INTRODUCTION 45
required to develop a new product. Changing the quality of a product often involves the
substitution of an old product with a new one, and therefore lower costs to develop a new
product directly translate into lower quality adjustment costs. For instance, in the last 15
years the cost of simulating a car￿ s performance has decreased 250 times. Substituting a
given car component with one of a di⁄erent quality is therefore much less costly than 15
years ago.
We embed non-price competition into an in￿nitely repeated dynamic duopoly game. This
paper builds on the standard dynamic duopoly models developed in the late eighties. Froot
and Klemperer (1989) consider a two-period duopoly competing in the domestic market
in which for each ￿rm the residual demand is a function of the market share in the ￿rst
period. The expected value of the exchange rate a⁄ects the value of the market share in the
second period, and therefore determines the optimal price in the ￿rst period. The authors
show that the magnitude and the sign of the exchange rate pass-through depend on whether
exchange rate changes are perceived to be temporary or permanent. The model proposed
in this paper presents a dynamic supply-side e⁄ect as in Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and
Krugman (1989). In these papers, the basic assumption is that ￿rms incur signi￿cant sunk
costs when entering foreign markets. These models predict that the exchange rate pass-
through will depend both on the expected duration and on the size of the exchange rate
change. Another model focusing on dynamic-side e⁄ects is the model of Kasa (1992). As in
Froot and Klemperer, a critical factor a⁄ecting the degree of exchange rate pass-through is
the relative importance of the transitory component of exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Exchange
rate changes that are perceived to be transitory are absorbed by changes in pro￿ts margins,
resulting in a low degree of pass-through to import prices. The model proposed in this paper
shares with the previous literature the dynamic-side e⁄ects, the partial equilibrium analysis,
and the assumption that prices are completely ￿ exible.
Unlike the previous literature, this model introduces non-price competition. Building
on Hotelling (1929), products are de￿ned as a triple of quality, price, and "characteristics".
It is assumed that consumers are heterogenous in the evaluation of characteristics, and
homogenous in the evaluation of quality. More speci￿cally, for a given price, all consumers
prefer higher quality, but they di⁄er in their evaluation of the characteristic. A foreign
and a domestic ￿rm compete in a duopoly framework. The domestic ￿rm￿ s price and costs
are expressed in the same currency. The foreign ￿rm instead sets the price in the local
market currency, but has costs in a di⁄erent currency. This feature exposes the market to
the ￿ uctuations of the exchange rate. In particular, in a ￿ exible price framework, if quality
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cannot be changed, an exchange rate depreciation of the domestic bilateral exchange rate
increases the foreign ￿rm￿ s costs expressed in domestic currency, increasing its prices and
decreasing its market shares.1 The foreign ￿rm, in order to insulate its pro￿ts from exchange
rate ￿ uctuations, optimally changes its costs by changing the quality of the product supplied
in the domestic market. This requires that the old product be substituted with a new one
of lower quality.
The way in which the two ￿rms operate in the market can be described using a two stage
game; ￿rst ￿rms compete in quality, then they compete in prices. The price competition is a
static game of complete information, since in each period both ￿rms observe the realization
of the exchange rate shock, and because current prices do not have any e⁄ect on future
demand or pro￿ts. The quality choice, also referred to as non-price competition, is instead a
dynamic problem, since any time the product varies from the previous period, ￿rms must pay
an adjustment cost that is assumed to be invariant through time. Given the structure of the
problem it is possible to de￿ne a unique Markov-Perfect equilibrium that is also a rational
expectation equilibrium: the beliefs of a ￿rm about its competitor quality in equilibrium are
correct and equal to the true amount of quality chosen by the competitor.
The model has three main results. First, the degree of exchange rate pass-through
crucially depends on the sector of analysis: the least costly is to change the product after
an exchange rate shock, the lower is the degree of pass-through. Second, the degree of
pass-through is lower, the higher the persistence of the shock or the bigger the magnitude
of the shock. The reason is that it is optimal for the ￿rms to adjust the quality of the
product more, when the shock is bigger or more persistent. Third, if product adjustment
costs decrease, then pass-through is lower. This is consistent with the observation that as
the costs of changing products have dropped in the recent years, the degree of exchange rate
pass-through has substantially decreased.
With respect to the static framework of non-price competition, the model has the ad-
vantage of being able to break the link between exchange rate value and quality variation; in
the dynamic framework we observe that quality is adjusted only when the shock is persistent
or it is big.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section (3.2) reviews the management
literature on product development. Section (3.3) describes the model. Section (3.4) explains
the game. Section (3.5) describes the results. Section (3.6) concludes.
1Notice that in a duopoly setting, when the costs of one of the two ￿rms increase, both ￿rms increase
their prices, but the ￿rm hit by the costs shock increases the price more than its competitor.
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3.2 Literature Review on Product Development
The business and management literature extensively shows that the costs and the speed
of products development have considerably changed in the last ￿fteen years. The main reason
for this change is the more widespread use of information technology (IT) in the product
development process.
Banker at al. (2006) study the impact of collaboration software on product design and de-
velopment. The so called Collaborative Product Commerce software (CPCs), is a relatively
new, web-based technology, used to improve product design and development processes.
CPCs allow product design engineers to collaborate with each other, by facilitating the shar-
ing of product data used in the design, by improving the timing of product design, and by
accelerating the product development cycle management.2 Using product design and devel-
opment data collected from a cross-sectional survey of 72 companies, the paper tests the
hypotheses regarding the implementation of CPCs and its impact on product design and
development. The authors ￿nd that CPCs has a signi￿cant impact on the level of collab-
oration among product design teams. Furthermore, improving the frequency and intensity
of collaboration among workers, CPCs leads to improved performance, in terms of greater
product design quality, lower design cycle time, and reduced product development cost. Fi-
nally the authors ￿nd that the software have both direct and indirect e⁄ects on product
development productivity, since the impact of CPCs is also mediated through improvements
in team collaboration.
Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) document that in recent years there has been an increasing
reliance on the use of IT to manage the product development life cycle. By reducing the
product development life cycle, IT have reduced the costs of supplying new products in the
market. The IT has increased considerably the team collaboration which is a well known
source of faster and cheaper products development.3 Finally it has also contributed to
the creation of new software able to simulate the e⁄ects that di⁄erent raw materials used in
production have on the products supplied. This type of software has dramatically reduced the
costs associated with product developments also in terms of working time. These innovations
have dramatically reduced product life cycles, leading to a much higher product turnover.
Davis et al. (2001) identify the way in which IT helps the development of new products.
The main argument is that IT facilitates collaboration within the environment of product
2See for example Welty and Becerra-Fernandez, (2001) and Carrol (2001).
3See for example Tushman (1977).
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development. The nature of collaboration during product design and development ranges
from face-to-face meetings and electronic communications involving phone, fax and e-mails,
to the exchange of formal design documents through shared databases and groupware. The
frequency and intensity of such interactions depends on several factors including missing
product data, ease of access, data de￿nition, and identi￿cation and evaluation of alternative
design trade-o⁄s. The authors ￿nd that in ￿rms where the interactions are not well struc-
tured, and design engineers lack the ability to collaborate e⁄ectively, due to the shortfall of a
single platform and appropriate standards to exchange product design data, the introduction
of the appropriate technology considerably improves the product development process.
Yassine at al. (2004) study the role of IT in customizing product design. They identify
the beginning of the eighties as the period in which the earlier IT tools were introduced in
the market. However, only in the nineties the use of IT boomed. Technology has reduced so
dramatically the costs of changing and adjusting products quickly, that product customizing
has become a feasible strategy for a ￿rm: GM, for example, through its ￿Order-To-Delivery￿
program is able to build and deliver customized cars in between ￿fteen and twenty days.
The authors divide the IT tools used in product developments according to three cate-
gories: communication, visualization and calculation tools. Communication tools are typi-
cally used for sharing business and technical informations. These tools ranges from simple
telephones and fax to videoconferencing, shared database and e-Business solutions. Visu-
alization tools are important for the display, sharing and communication in non-contextual
information such as product designs and engineering drawings. Such tools consist mainly in
CAD systems. These systems (especially 3D-CAD technologies) provide the possibility for
creating ￿digital mock-ups￿which replace the need for building physical prototypes at early
stages of product development. Calculation tools allow for the manipulation of data and
the creation of new knowledge. Such tools consist mainly of simulation software and math-
ematical prototypes/models. These tools dramatically reduce the costs and time of product
development: for example, building an automotive physical prototype takes between four
and six months to construct at an average cost of $500,000. With these tools an engineer
can prepare the designed model and simulate it in two or three days for about $2000.4
Ozer (2000) presents a survey of business publications showing that companies are ex-
tensively using IT in their product development activities. The author identi￿es 9 categories
in which IT can facilitate new product development. These categories are speed, productiv-
ity, collaboration,communication, coordination, versatility, knowledge management, decision
4See Crabb (1998) and Thomke (1998)
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quality, and product quality. Ozer reports several case studies in which companies quantify
the e⁄ects that the introduction of IT has had in their products￿development process. All
the companies report huge improvements in all the categories mentioned above. We mention
just one of the examples reported in the article, the Protodigm, a British drug development
company, that through the use of IT was able to reduce the time of developing a new drug
from seven to four years and to reduce the cost by 30%￿ 40%.
These empirical studies testify that in the last years the use of IT has reduced the costs
of creating new products. This cost reduction has undoubtedly made it more pro￿table
to launch new products in reaction to both demand side and supply side shocks. Even if
the IT e⁄ect might have been stronger for products with a higher technological content, it
seems that it has a⁄ected the time and costs required to change all sorts of goods, including
cars or fruit juices. In the case of fruit juice, for example, the IT has reduced the time of
communications along the production line, the time of changing the design of the product￿ s
container or its label, the time and the costs necessary to implement marketing analysis able
to assess whether the new product will have success or not. In the next section we study the
e⁄ects that the reduced cost of changing products has on price rigidity.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Products
The world market is a linear city, where two ￿rms produce two di⁄erentiated products.
Each product is characterized by the triple (si;t; pi;t; xi;t), where subscript t denotes time,
and subscript i 2 fd;fg denotes the country of origin of the ￿rm, domestic or foreign.
The linear city is a segment of unit length in the closed interval [0;1]. Firms are located at
the extremes of the city, and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the domestic ￿rm is
located at xd;t = 0 and the foreign ￿rm at xf;t = 1. xi;t represents the ￿characteristic￿of the
product and is de￿ned as a peculiarity perceived as relevant by consumers, but which does
not a⁄ect production costs (an example of a product￿ s characteristic is its color). Consumers
are uniformly distributed along the segment and their location de￿nes their preferences over
the characteristics xi;t.
si;t represents the amount of quality in the product and is de￿ned as a feature on which
all consumers agree over the preference ordering: for a given price and a given characteristic,
the product with a higher amount of quality is preferred by each consumer (an example
of quality is the product￿ s raw material). Di⁄erently from the characteristic, the quality is
positively related both to variable and ￿x costs. si;t and xi;t are assumed to be independent.
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Finally pi;t; de￿nes the price of the good.
3.3.2 Consumers
Consumers are fully characterized by their location x in the segment [0;1]: They are
thus heterogenous in the evaluation of the characteristic and homogenous in the quality
evaluation.5 We assume that the consumers￿utility is decreasing in the distance between
the good￿ s characteristic xi and x; decreasing in the price of the product pi, and increasing
in its quality si. The consumers￿behavior is static and demand is unitary. In every period
t; consumers have full information on characteristics and prices of the two ￿rms, and they
decides whether to buy or not a unit of a good, and if so, from which ￿rm to buy. The utility
of consumer x that buys good i at time t is:
ui;t = k + si;t ￿ pi;t ￿ ￿ jx ￿ xij;
where ￿ jx ￿ xij represents the consumer￿ s transportation costs, and ￿ is the unit transporta-
tion costs. This parameter must be interpreted as the marginal cost for a consumer of moving
away from her ideal type of good. The utility of the outside alternative, i.e. not purchasing
the good, is normalized to zero. k is a parameter which ensures that the market is always
covered.
A consumer purchases a unit of good i if ui;t ￿ 0 and if ui;t ￿ u￿i;t. The above condition
can be rewritten as k + si;t ￿ pi;t + ￿ jx ￿ xij. We derive now the time invariant consumers￿
demands for each product; we omit the time subindex for notation clarity. Let b x 2 [0; 1]
denote the location of the consumer that is indi⁄erent between purchasing from ￿rm i and
￿rm ￿i. Thus:
si ￿ pi ￿ ￿ jb x ￿ xij = s￿i ￿ p￿i ￿ ￿ jb x ￿ x￿ij: (3.1)
Since xi = 0; and x￿1 = 1, solving equation (3.1) for b x provides:








A ￿domestic￿￿rm and a ￿foreign￿￿rm compete in the domestic market. Both ￿rms
therefore set prices in the domestic currency. We de￿ne as domestic (foreign) the ￿rm whose
5In the textbook version of vertical product di⁄erentiation, when consumers are homogenous in the
evaluation of quality, if goods of di⁄erent quality are supplied, all consumers always prefer the good with
the highest quality, if they purchase at all (see Tirole 1988). This means that the low quality product is
dominated. In our setting instead, since consumers are concerned also about the characteristic of the good,
in equilibrium it is possible to observe di⁄erent qualities without having to assume consumers￿heterogeneity
in the evaluation of quality.
Ascione, Aurora (2009), Three Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/26663.4. THE GAME 51
costs are expressed in the domestic (foreign) currency. The foreign ￿rm￿ s costs are converted
in the domestic currency through the nominal bilateral exchange rate. The nominal bilateral
exchange rate is a stochastic variable that evolves according to a Markov process given by:
et = e
￿
t￿1 exp"t where "t ￿ N(0;￿
2
") (3.3)
The realization of et is common knowledge for both ￿rms and consumers, and its future
realization is the only source of uncertainty of the economy. For a given amount of quality,
a depreciation (appreciation) of the exchange rate increases (decreases) foreign ￿rm￿ s costs
expressed in domestic currency, leaving the domestic ￿rm￿ s costs unchanged. A variation of
the nominal bilateral exchange rate thus leads to ￿ uctuations of the relative costs of the two
￿rms. However, ￿rms can insulate these ￿ uctuations in the relative costs, by changing the
quality of the goods. This behavior can be described using a stationary discrete-time in￿nite
horizon game explained in the following section.
3.4 The Game
Time is discrete. Every period t ￿rms observe the realization of the exchange rate
shock. Given this information, ￿rms choose ￿rst the amount of quality and then compete in
prices. The Bertrand game is static because current prices do not have any e⁄ect on future
demand or pro￿ts. The equilibrium prices of the Bertrand game determine the equilibrium
pro￿ts for each ￿rm at time t as a function of the amount of quality they choose. Firms
decide simultaneously the amount of quality that maximizes their pro￿ts given the optimal
response of the competitor. This problem is dynamic because it is assumed that every time
￿rms change the quality with respect to the previous period, they incur a quadratic cost
of adjustment. The dynamics of the model are thus generated by the exogenous stochastic
process of the nominal bilateral exchange rate, and by the forward looking choice of quality
over time.
3.4.1 Price Competition: the Spot Market
In this subsection we omit the time subscript for notational simplicity. The price com-
petition game is a static game of complete information. Firms maximize pro￿ts taking as
given the value of the nominal bilateral exchange rate and both their own and their com-
petitor￿ s previous period quality. In order to restrict the analysis on the duopoly outcome
the following assumption must hold:
A.1 8s 2 S; jCi(si;e) ￿ C￿i(s￿i;e) + s￿i ￿ sij < 3￿;
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where Ci(si;e) (C￿i(s￿i;e)) represents ￿rm i (￿i) marginal costs that are function of
their own quality and of the nominal bilateral exchange rate e. Assumption (A.1) is a
necessary condition for a duopoly equilibrium to emerge. If A.1 is violated, the marginal
costs of the two ￿rms are too di⁄erent to allow both ￿rms to compete in the same market.
It also states that 8s does not exist a characteristics level for which one of the two ￿rms
could be monopolist. Since in the dynamic game ￿rms choose the level of characteristics
and therefore their marginal costs, at that stage it must checked that the ￿rms endogenously
choose levels of characteristics that satisfy assumption (A.1). In appendix (3.2) we show
that this indeed will be the case for each given level of characteristics s.
Given assumption (A.1) we can de￿ne the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the static game:
Proposition 3.1 Suppose assumption (A.1) holds, then ￿rm i and ￿i play a duopoly price




















Proof. Each ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts taking the price of the other ￿rm as given. It follows












Each ￿rm maximizes its pro￿t by choosing its best-response price. The best-response of ￿rm
i is characterized by the ￿rst order condition:






that combined with the reaction function of the competitor delivers the equilibrium prices,
and hence the quantities and the pro￿ts stated in Proposition 1.
For each level of characteristics in the characteristics state space we ￿nd a unique
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium given by that described in Proposition 1.
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3.4.2 Non-Price Competition: the Dynamic Analysis
3.4.2.1 The Primitives
The interaction among the two ￿rms in the dynamic setting can be described by the
following set of primitives which are common knowledge to the two ￿rms:
f(S;S);(E;E);￿;￿;￿i(e;s￿i;si);Ri(si;￿1;;s￿i;e;si);e;￿g:
(S;S) and (E;E) are measurable spaces which de￿ne the support for the endogenous variables
s;and the exogenous state variable e, respectively; in particular:
A.4 s 2 S ￿ R+; e 2 E ￿ R+;
A.5 S is a convex Borel set in R2
+, with its Borel subsets S;
The state space is ￿ = S ￿S ￿E ￿ R+ ￿R+ ￿R+, and ￿ : ￿ ! S is a correspondence
describing the feasibility constraint. It is further assumed that:
A.6 ￿ is nonempty, compact valued, and continuous;
￿i(e;s￿i;si) denotes the pro￿t function of ￿rm i; computed at the equilibrium of the
price game, as written in Proposition 1. It is assumed that the quality can be changed in
each period, but quality changes are associated with quadratic costs of adjustment. In each
period the objective function of each ￿rm is therefore given by the equilibrium pro￿t of the
price competition game in Proposition 1, minus the ￿xed costs associated with the quality
level, minus the quadratic adjustment cost associated with the quality change; that is:
Ri(si;￿1;s￿i;e;si) = ￿i(e;s￿i;si) ￿ Ai(si) ￿ B(si ￿ si;￿1)
2:
for each e 2 E we assume that Ri(si;￿1;s￿i;e;si) is strictly concave. This restriction on
the one period return function ensures the unicity of steady state equilibrium. In particular
the term Ai(si) guarantees the intersection of the reaction functions of the two ￿rms with
respect to qualities; ￿nally, ￿ is the common discount factor of the ￿rms and satis￿es:
A.7 ￿ 2 (0;1);
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3.4.2.2 Dynamic Game
At any time t the dynamic problem of the two ￿rms is to choose simultaneously the
optimal quality levels that maximize their expected present value of net cash ￿ ows given the
state of the economy (si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e). Firms choose their amount of quality simultaneously
after the exchange rate shock is realized. Both ￿rms have complete information on the
realization of the shock and on their own and their competitor￿ s costs. The intertemporal





















For any given si;t the distribution used to form expectations in (3.5) can be derived from
the ￿rm￿ s perception of the Markov transition kernel for its competitor, and the controlled
Markov stated in (3.3). This formulation has a stationary Markovian structure. That is,
the current states (si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) and the current decision, si are su¢ cient to determine the
evolution to the next state (si;s￿i;e0). This implies that for each of the two ￿rms the optimal
quality strategy, if it exists, can be chosen from the class of stationary Markov strategies.
Therefore, the optimal quality choice, denoted by the policy function Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e);
depends only on the current states (si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e): This implies that the problem is recursive,





s:t: s￿i = G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) (3.7)
In any state, for each ￿rm, the optimal quality choice must solve the above Bellman equation
given the symmetric policy function of the competitor.
3.4.2.3 The Equilibrium
We study the dynamic equilibrium of the market arising from the competitive interaction
between the domestic and the foreign ￿rm. The equilibrium is one of ￿rational expectations￿ ,
in the sense that, in equilibrium, the beliefs of ￿rm i on the optimal decision strategy
of its competitor, must be equal to ￿rm ￿i true policy function. The two ￿rms solve a
dynamic programming problem that is interdependent only through the states of the economy
(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e), such that their quality strategies remain optimal at every state, regardless
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of how that state was reached, against the optimal decision of the competitor. Thus we can
say that the equilibrium is also a Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the sense of Maskin
and Tirole (1988) and (2001). Given Assumptions (A.4)-(A.7), and equation (3.3) we can
therefore de￿ne:
DEFINITION 8(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) 2 ￿ The Markov Perfect Equilibrium is given by a
pair of value functions Vi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) and a pair of policy function Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) such
that:
1. Given G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e), Vi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) satis￿es (3.6);








Given our de￿nition of the equilibrium we want now to show that the equilibrium exists
and is unique;
Proposition 3.2 Consider the ￿rm￿ s decision problem (3.6). 8si 2 [si;si] ￿ S and 8e 2
[e;e] ￿ E under the Assumptions (A.4)-(A.7):
a. there exist a unique Vi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e); V : R3
+ ! R+ , monotonic increasing in si; uni-
formly bounded, and satisfying (3.6);
b. there exists a unique optimal policy function, Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e); G : R3
+ ! R+:
Proof. a. Monotonicity:











Take an a ￿ 0: We have:
T(Vi + a)(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) = max
s2￿










= TVi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) + ￿a
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that satis￿es the discounting property.
b. The proof of uniqueness of the policy function Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) is straightforward
since the concavity of the one period return with respect to the endogenous state variable
ensures that the sequence of the approximated policy functions fGng converges to the optimal
policy function Gi(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e):
3.5 Results
In this section we describe the results of the model. The algorithm we have used to
solve the model is described in Appendix (3.1). The results discussed in this section have an
absolute error of 10￿9 and a relative error of 10￿8: Solving for the optimal policy functions
shows that the quality choice of each ￿rm depends positively on their previous period quality,
and negatively on the previous period amount of the competitor￿ s quality. The ￿rst result can
be explained in the light of adjustment costs, the second by the fact that ￿rms ￿nd pro￿table
to slightly di⁄erentiate their products also along the quality dimension. The exchange rate
a⁄ects positively the quality of the domestic ￿rm and negatively the quality of the foreign
￿rm. The higher the exchange rate, the higher the costs of the foreign ￿rm, the more the
foreign ￿rm will ￿nd optimal to reduce its quality in order to reduce its costs.
We have performed an impulse response analysis of a depreciation of the domestic ex-
change rate. We have analyzed a symmetric equilibrium in which before the shock the two
￿rms have the same costs, prices and characteristics. In order to analyze the role of the per-
sistence of the shock, we have analyzed a case in which ￿ = 0:7; de￿ned as high persistency,
and a case in which ￿ = 0:2; de￿ned as low persistency. We have also analyzed the impact
of two shocks of di⁄erent magnitude.
As in Baldwin (1990), for a given parametrization of the model, increasing the persistency
or the size of the shock delivers similar qualitative predictions. We thus limit the description
of the results to the comparison of high and low persistency shocks, since the insights that
we could get by comparing big and small exchange rate shock are identical.
In the static model of non-price competition, when quality is a continuous choice variable,
a change in the exchange rate generates a quality adjustment.
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The ￿gure above plots the domestic and foreign qualities in percentage deviations from
the steady state, for di⁄erent degrees of persistence, and in the case in which there are no
adjustment costs, i.e., B = 0. In this limit case, the outcome of the model collapses to the
equilibrium of a static game of quality competition. A depreciation of the exchange rate
causes a reduction of the foreign quality and an increment of the domestic quality. The
magnitude of quality adjustments is the same for both high and low persistency, but the
higher the persistency of the shock the slower the quality goes back to its steady state value.
No matter what the persistence of the shock is, quality always decreases by the same amount
in the ￿rst period.
At the same time prices of both ￿rms increase and market shares change in favor of the
domestic ￿rm. These results are shown in the following pictures.
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The above ￿gure shows the response of prices to an exchange rate shock, with and without
quality changes. Prices are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state. An
exchange rate depreciation increases prices: the highest line represents the price change of
the foreign ￿rm when quality is held constant. When ￿rm F adjusts the quality, the price
adjustment is much more moderate: it is represented in the lowest line in the plot above.
Also for the domestic ￿rm, prices increase less when quality can be adjusted: this can be
seen in the plot, where the second highest line represents the domestic price with quality
change, and the third highest line represents the domestic price￿ s increment when quality is
held constant. It is possible to notice that when quality can be changed, the domestic price
reacts more than the foreign price, while the opposite is true when quality is kept constant.
After an exchange rate depreciation, when quality can be changed pD increases relatively
more than pF since ￿rm￿ s D quality is higher than ￿rm￿ s F quality. The quality gap between
the two ￿rms decreases the relative demand elasticity of ￿rm D0s consumers, allowing ￿rm
D to set a higher mark-up. This explains why the domestic ￿rm sets higher prices than ￿rm
F following an exchange rate depreciation.
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The expenditure switching in favor of the domestic good is much higher when ￿rms are
allowed to change quality. This result is shown in the picture above. The logic behind
this result is the following: for a given level of quality, a depreciation of the exchange rate
increases the marginal costs of the foreign ￿rm expressed in domestic currency. The impulse
response shows that the foreign ￿rm reduces the amount of quality and increases the prices.
The domestic ￿rm increases the quality level slightly and the price level more. Overall the
two ￿rms increase prices less than in the case in which the quality is held constant, leading
to a smaller exchange rate pass-through than in standard models with strategic interaction.
The domestic ￿rm￿ s market shares increase more than in the standard duopoly models due
to an increase in the relative quality of the domestic product. With respect to the standard
duopoly models, allowing the market to clear along the quality dimension generates lower
pass-through and a higher degree of expenditure switching.
The foreign ￿rm decreases the quality of the product supplied even if this entails a lower
market share. Following a depreciation, marginal revenues, expressed in the foreign currency,
decrease. The foreign producer optimally curbs the reduction in pro￿ts by cutting its costs.
This can be done by diminishing the quality content of the good. The decrease of the quality,
as well as the increase in prices, has a negative e⁄ect on the foreign ￿rm market shares. The
combination of a low degree of exchange rate pass-through together with an expenditure
switching e⁄ect is a result that relies on our assumptions on both the costs structure and
non-price competition among ￿rms. Quality adjustment costs do not matter for these results.
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3.5.1 The role of the quality￿ s adjustment cost
When B = 0 the model reproduces the results of the static game of non-price compe-
tition. When B > 0 instead ￿rms incur a cost every time they change the quality. This
cost induces ￿rms to adjust the quality taking into account the size and the persistence of
the shock. When B > 0 the impulse response of the foreign quality for di⁄erent degrees of
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When ￿rms incur in costs of adjustment, the persistence of the shock plays a much
important role. The higher the persistence of the shock the bigger the quality adjustment
in the ￿rst period, and the slower the return to the steady state.
As a consequence, for shocks of high persistency we observe bigger expenditure switching
together with a lower degree of pass-through. This result is at odds with the previous
theoretical literature that predicts that the higher the persistency, the bigger the degree
of pass-through. However, it is reasonable to think that when shocks are more persistent,
￿rms have higher incentives to adjust their quality than if shocks are less persistent. The
adjustment of quality depends also on the value of B. Taking constant the dimension of the
shock and its persistency, the bigger the value of B the smaller the quality adjustment.
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The picture above plots the outcome of the same impulse as in the previous picture, but
given a higher B. For shocks of low persistency, quality exhibits little reaction. The same
holds true in the opposite case. We can de￿ne two threshold values for B.6
B
                      B1                                                    B2
HP/LP Adj.                              HP Adj.                         No Adj.
6In the following picture the abbreviation "HP/LP Adj". identi￿es the region for quadratic costs of
adjustment smaller that the treshold B1; in this region ￿rms always adjust quality: for both high persistency
(big) shocks and low persistency (small) shocks. The abbreviation "HP Adj." means that when B1 < B < B2
￿rms adjust quality only if the shocks have high persistency or are big. Finally "No Adj." identi￿es the region
on the left of B2; where ￿rms never adjust quality independetly of the persistence and the magnitude of the
exchange rate shocks.
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When B ￿ B1 ￿rms adjust quality regardless of the size and persistence of the exchange
rate shock. When B1 ￿ B ￿ B2 ￿rms adjust quality only for high persistency (big size)
exchange rate shocks, ￿nally when B > B2 ￿rms never adjust quality. The relation between
costs of adjustment and persistence of the shock has novel e⁄ects on the degree of pass-
through. When the costs of adjusting quality are less than B1; the degree of pass-through
is always smaller than in the standard case, since quality always adjusts. When B > B2 we
are back to the standard duopoly model. With respect to the static non-price competition
model, the novel result relies on the case of B > B1: above this threshold the quality adjusts
depending on the persistence and on the magnitude of the exchange rate shock.
The model introduces a novel result also with respect to the previous dynamic literature
on exchange rate pass-though. The papers by Froot and Klemperer, and Baldwin predict
that bigger and/or more persistent shocks are associated with a higher degree of exchange
rate pass-through with respect to smaller and less persistent shocks. In the model proposed
in this paper, when B1 ￿ B ￿ B2 and if the persistence is low, quality does not adjust, and
the degree of pass-through is the same as in the standard model. If instead the persistence
of the shock is high enough, given the same value of B, quality adjusts and the degree of
pass-through is smaller than in the standard model. Shocks with higher persistence, or of
bigger size, are thus associated with quality variations and with lower degree of exchange
rate pass-through. The relation between prices and the persistence of the shock may seem
counter intuitive, but it is perfectly plausible to expect that product modi￿cations occurs
for bigger shocks or for shocks that are expected to last for longer.
The cost B is a parameter that represents the state of technology required to change a
product or given features of it. We can imagine that B di⁄ers from sector to sector, or also
that it changes over time. For example in the apparel sector, in which product change very
frequently, we can imagine that B is much smaller in than in the sector of machinery, where
it is very di¢ cult to adjust the product after a design is made.
One of the implications of the model is thus that in sectors in which B is relatively smaller
the degree of pass-through will be lower than in sectors where B is higher. Firms adjust the
quality easily and can do it for both high and low persistence shock. This behavior implies a
low degree of pass-through since the exchange rate shock can be transmitted more through
the real channel of quality than through the nominal channel of prices. In sectors where the
costs of changing quality are instead prohibitive, we expect producers not to resort to quality
changes. Our model thus predicts that prices should be more ￿ exible in these sectors.
The second implication comes from the consideration that due to technological progress
it is less costly to change products today than it was in the past. As the empirical evidence
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presented in Section 3.2 shows, the IT revolution has dramatically reduced all the costs
related to the design and product development. If the costs of developing a new product
decrease, also the costs of changing the quality will fall, since changing quality requires
the development of a new product. If technological process has decreased the value of B
over time, more and more sectors in the economy have enjoyed the possibility of adjusting
quality in response to shocks. This has most likely generated a gradual increment of product
variation in response to shocks, reducing the degree of exchange rate pass-through.
The dynamic model is thus able to o⁄er a potential explanation either for the di⁄erent
degree of exchange rate pass-through across sectors, or, in an intertemporal perspective, for
the reduction of exchange rate pass-through in the last 15 years.
3.6 Conclusion
In recent years the empirical literature has shown that the degree of exchange rate pass-
through has been decreasing over time. In this paper we propose an explanation for this
evidence, attributing the decline of exchange rate pass-through to the increment of competi-
tion in non-price dimension among ￿rms to the prejudice of price competition. The increase
of non-price competition has been due to the reduction of the costs of products develop-
ment: the technological process has thus created the opportunity to substitute products in
the market more quickly and cheaply. The reduction of the costs of changing products has
had an e⁄ect on prices which appear to be more sticky. According to our theory prices are
only apparently constant, since if it were possible to control for quality, prices would change.
This hypothesis is formalized as an equilibrium outcome of an in￿nitely repeated game
in which a domestic and a foreign ￿rm compete both in price and in non-price dimensions.
If exchange rate shock occurs, the ￿rms can adjust or not the quality of the product they
supply, depending on adjustment costs. If the cost of changing quality is low enough, ￿rms
not only adjust prices but also qualities. If the cost of changing quality is high, ￿rms adjust
the quality only if the shock is big enough or the persistence is high enough. The adjustment
of quality a⁄ects prices that react more if the shock has a low persistence or it is small.
These results have important implications: ￿rst, the degree of pass-through will be sector
speci￿c. In the sector where it is less costly to adjust the quality, we expect to observe more
quality adjustment also when shocks are small and less persistent, and thus we expect a
lower degree of exchange rate pass-through. Second, since the costs of adjusting products
have declined in the last twenty years, it is plausible to expect that ￿rms have resorted
to non-price competition more extensively, thus generating an apparent increase in price
stickiness.
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The model can be extended in several directions. It might be interesting to see what the
properties of the model are in a general equilibrium framework, and to study the testable
implication of the model proposed in this paper. We leave this analysis for future research.






The usual way of solving a dynamic game is implementing the Linear Quadratic algorithm
(L-Q). In order to solve the L-Q algorithm, the one period return function must be quadratic,
or, if it is not, it should be possible to determine the deterministic steady state before the
algorithm is computed in order to compute the second order Taylor approximation around it
to reshape the problem in a quadratic form. The one period return function of the problem
described above can neither be expressed as quadratic, nor is possible to solve for the steady-
state equilibrium. We therefore use the collocation method to solve the model.7 We describe
in the next subsection the algorithm used to compute the policy functions.
The Algorithm
The collocation method provides a straightforward strategy to solve for functional equations.
Using the collocation method the policy functions of the two ￿rms can be considered as an









where the policy function is expressed as a linear combination of a set of n linearly inde-
pendent basis functions ’j1j2j3 and dj1j2j3 basis coe¢ cients that are the unknowns of the
function. In tensor notation, the approximant can be written:
b G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e) =
￿
￿i(si) ￿ ￿￿i(s￿i) ￿ ￿e(e)
￿
d
7See Miranda and Fackler (2002).
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where d is an￿1 column vector and each ￿￿ is the 1￿n￿ row vector of basis functions over the
dimension ￿. n =
l Y
￿=1
n￿ basis coe¢ cients are ￿xed by requiring the approximant to satisfy
the functional equation, not at all possible points of the domain, but rather at n prescribed
points in the approximation space, called the collocation nodes. Given the multivariate
nature of the problem and the values of the relative residual function that we obtain, we
report the results that we get for n￿ = 2 for each of the states of the economy. n￿ = 2 for
each of the states implies eight collocation nodes, and eight unknown basis coe¢ cients for
each policy function.
Step 1: De￿nition of functional forms and parameter values. In order to solve the
￿rms￿maximization problem, we need to specify functional forms for the model. Marginal
and ￿xed costs functional equations are de￿ned as:
C(si;t;et) =
(
cisi;t for i = d
c￿
isi;tet for i = f
Ai;t(si;t) = ais
2
i;t for i = d;f:
Foreign ￿rm￿ s marginal costs are expressed in foreign currency, while foreign ￿rm￿ s ￿x costs
are expressed in domestic currency. This speci￿cation allows to analyze just the e⁄ects
that an exchange rate shock has on the spot market. If both the foreign ￿rm￿ s costs of
adjustment and the ￿x costs were expressed in foreign currency, the foreign ￿rm￿ s decision
of changing characteristics would depend exclusively on the importance of these costs with
respect to revenues. Also in the case of a small depreciation, the costs of selling high
characteristics goods would be not compensate by the associated revenues, and foreign ￿rm
will always decrease the amount of characteristics. When only marginal costs are function of
the exchange rate instead, we are able to capture how selling an extra unit of the good in the
domestic market increase the costs of the foreign ￿rm, and thus to consider only the direct
e⁄ect of selling an extra unit of characteristics. In each period, given the costs speci￿cation,
the concavity of Ri is guaranteed if:
(1 ￿ cie)
2 < 18￿(ai + B) with e = 1 if i = d:
The parameter values have been chosen in order that Assumption (A.1)-(A.7) hold given the
functional forms of the model and the above condition on the concavity of the one period
return holds as well.
Step 2: De￿nition of the approximation space. we have to de￿ne a compact set of
(si;s￿i;e) pairs over which solve the algorithm. The choice consists in four parameters s, s,
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e, e: The choice of the upper and lower bound of s must be done in order to obtain a steady
state value that is contained in the interval, similarly for the value of e.
Step 3: Computation of the Euler equations. Once the control variable of the com-
petitor is de￿ned as the unknown function, we compute the Euler equations of the two ￿rms.
For each ￿rm the Euler equation is equal to:
0 =
(si(1 ￿ ci) + G￿i(si;￿1;s￿i;￿1;e)(c￿iet ￿ 1) + 3￿)
18￿
￿ aisi;t ￿ B(si ￿ si;￿1) +
￿Et
￿￿







we thus obtain a system of two equations (the two Euler), in two unknowns (the two policy
functions). In each Euler equation we approximate the expectation operator using a Gauss-
Hermite quadrature choosing the number of nodes equal two.8
Step 4: Solution of the collocation equations we solve the collocation equations in
order to ￿nd the given Chebicev nodes.
Step 5: Computation of the basis coe¢ cients. Given the Euler equations evaluated at
the Chebicev nodes, we ￿nd, by Newton￿ s method, the sixteen basis coe¢ cients that solve
for the zeros of the equations.
3.2 Time Consistency
In this subsection we analyze the conditions under which assumption (A.1) holds in the sta-
tic and the dynamic game; this is equivalent to say that when ￿rms have the possibility of
reoptimize their quality in the dynamic game, they choose an amount of quality that satis￿es
assumption (A.1). In the dynamic game ￿rms could ￿nd pro￿table to deviate from assump-
tion (A.1), reducing their quality and hence their marginal costs such that assumption (A.1)
does not hold anymore; in this occurrence the ￿rm that deviates becomes the monopolist.
This scenario however does not realize if the following assumptions hold:
A.2 Ci(si;e) < 1;
8A higher number of nodes does not change the results and the relative error.
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(A.2) follows fromthe static maximization problem of the ￿rms and guarantees that ￿i(e;g (s￿i);si)
is strictly increasing in si. This assumption leads to the possibility of observing in equilib-
rium a quality level di⁄erent from the lowest possible level. If the intratemporal pro￿ts were
decreasing in si indeed, ￿rms would o⁄er always the lowest possible quality and it would
never be observed characteristics changes.
(A.3) follows from (A.1) and (A.2), and relates the expected stream of pro￿t of a ￿rm that
reduces its quality in order to be the monopolist in the market (L.H.S.), and the expected
stream of pro￿ts of a ￿rm always playing a duopoly in the highest possible characteris-
tics level (R.H.S.). It is assumed that given the realization of the exchange rate, once a
￿rm chooses a quality lower than the highest possible in order to get the monopoly pro￿ts
(RM
i;t(si;t￿1;s￿i;t￿1;et;si;t)), the ￿rm gets them for just one period but from the next period
on, it receives the lowest possible characteristics duopoly pro￿ts. This is due to the reac-
tion of the ￿rm that has not deviate by the duopoly strategy who punish the competitor
supplying the lowest possible quality for ever (RD
i;t(si;t￿1;s￿i;t￿1;et;si;t)).
Even when an exchange rate shock occurs such that assumption (A.1) does not hold anymore,
the ￿rms￿best strategy is to choose a new level of quality that restores assumption (A.1).
Suppose that after a large depreciation of the exchange rate, foreign ￿rm￿ s marginal costs
are too high with respect to those of the domestic ￿rms, to compete in the market. In order
to sell a positive quantity, the foreign ￿rm will reduce its amount of quality, but by (A.2) and
(A.3), it will choose the highest possible quality level compatible with the new value of the
nominal bilateral exchange rate. On the other hand, due to assumption (A.3) the domestic
￿rm, whose marginal costs are not increased, cannot do better than choose a new quality
level compatible with (A.1). This can be equal or lower than that of the period before.
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